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Dear readers!

We have an anniversary – we offer to your attention the 80th issue of the analytical bulletin "IISEPS News", containing materials reflecting the most interesting results of the Institute researches in the second quarter of 2016. It is hard to believe that in the harsh political climate of Belarus, despite "frost and heat", every three months in the course of these difficult 20 years our readers (including our friends and enemies, Belarusians and foreigners, experienced professionals and people far from politics and science) have been receiving a publication, which has no equivalents in the country.

Our research studies demonstrate that in general financial well-being of Belarusians has slightly improved, although it is still unstable. Average per capita income (including salaries, pensions, social benefits and other incomes) increased from \$ 147 in March up to \$ 170 in June. However, over 80% of respondents still believe that Belarusian economy is in crisis. Major part of respondents is convinced that the reasons for this crisis are internal. Among the most acute problems facing the country and its citizens are price hike, unemployment, impoverishment of people, and production decline. Evaluating A. Lukashenko's decree increasing retirement age, over 70% of respondents believe that it shouldn't have been increased as "most people won't live long enough" to receive pensions at all. As for his recent statement that "Amid the current troubled situation Belarus is rightly considered as a nook of stability", only one third of respondents agreed with it. Over a half of respondents consider that "our stability is closer to stagnation, and there is no development in the country". According to most respondents, citizens of all neighboring countries (except Ukraine which is currently at war) enjoy higher standards of life in comparison with Belarus.

Belarusians' attitude to state institutions remains quite critical in general. Today the number of respondents who don't trust the main state institutions is still higher than the number of those who trust them. Majority of Belarusians hold the President responsible for the current economic crisis. Most of respondents disagreed with the main thesis of the Spring Message of A. Lukashenko to the Belarusian people and the National Assembly. Belarusians grow more and more critical of changes in the social structure of society happening under the influence of state policy: the role of power agents becomes more important, and the role of cultural/scientific elite and common people constantly diminishes. Ten years ago 37% of respondents believed that A. Lukashenko relies mostly on the presidential hierarchy line, today this share amounts to 55% (state officials – 20 % vs. 32% accordingly; cultural and scientific elite – 8% vs. 4%; retired people – 41% vs. 22%; rural men – 30% vs. 12%; common people – 34% vs. 8%). That is why less than 30% of respondents agree that "it is my state, it protects my interests".

The desire for changes in the Belarusian society doesn't decrease. Ten years ago most of respondents considered that maintaining of the current situation was more important for them, today majority of them support changes. Growing dissatisfaction with the policy of the power and the opposition is visible in the way people assess the most important political events of both sides – the All-Belarusian People's Assembly in June and the Congress of Democratic Forces in May. Majority of respondents considers these events as "shows for the people", but one of the shows is performed by the power, and the other one by opposition. Elections and referendums remain the most realistic and desirable variant of changes for the majority of Belarusians. Today almost 52% of respondents are ready to vote in parliamentary elections on September 11. The share of respondents who would support candidates opposing to Lukashenko is even slightly bigger than the share of those who would prefer the head of state's supporters. At the same time most of respondents believe that results of these elections don't depend on their votes.

The "pendulum" of geopolitical orientations of Belarusians continues its swing towards the European end. The number of those who would prefer Russia in a hypothetical choice between either joining the EU or integrating Russia has significantly decreased. Accordingly, the number of those who would prefer the EU has increased. Our research demonstrates that there is no deep aggressive anti-Americanism in Belarus as compared to Russia. Geopolitical orientations of Belarusians are expressed best when there is a question on a real or hypothetical situation of an armed conflict. Majority of respondents don't support either Russia or NATO in the arms buildup in the region. But if such a conflict happened, most of respondents would "try not to support either side". "It's not my funeral" principle is also observed in the relation to the armed conflict in Ukraine: more than 70% of respondents express negative attitude towards participation of Belarusian citizens in the armed conflict in Ukraine both on the side of the Ukrainian army and on the side of armed protesters.

As usual, those readers who are more interested in our figures than in our assessments can analyze the research results on their own. The results are presented as a plain count up according to the main socio-demographic characteristics.

In our "Open Forum" rubric we continue to present the most interesting results of the latest surveys of our colleagues from neighboring countries.

As usual, your feedback and comments are welcome!

IISEPS' Board

MONITORING OF PUBLIC OPINION IN BELARUS

In June of 2016 independent sociologists have conducted the nation opinion poll (those face-to-face interviewed are 1.512 persons aged 18 and over, margin of error doesn't exceed 0.03).

The questionnaires, as usual, covered a wide range of problems related to the most pressing and most topical aspects of life in Belarus.

Below you will find commentaries to the most important findings of these and previous sociological procedures. "No answer" and "Find it difficult to answer" alternatives are not available in most points of the questionnaire. As usual, the tables are read down unless otherwise specified. In some tables, the total amount may be different from 100% since the interviewees could choose more than one alternative.

JUNE – 2016

Passive adaptation to crisis has its limit

Analyzing May events in Belarus we've supposed that adaptation of the Belarusian society to crisis would be the main trend of the second quarter of the year. That is why with a high level of probability June survey should have registered the so-called "effect of negative stabilization", based on public apathy and indifference. Belarusians will choose regime of economy more and more often.

Survey results confirmed our forecast (Tables 1-3). In March we've registered a collapse of the three social indices in comparison with December. In June all the three indices started to grow. Stabilization of ruble played a significant role in the swinging back the pendulum of social moods.

inability of the Belarusian state to curb inflation for 25 years already. In the end this leads to the weakening of ruble. The second denomination in Belarus (starting on July 1), this time getting rid of four zeros, graphically demonstrates one of main "appeals" of the Belarusian model.

State mass media campaign dedicated to the V All-Belarusian People's Assembly has probably contributed a certain share in the growth of positive moods.

Looking into the future with optimism is one of characteristics of normal psychology. In June the share of Belarusians believing in the possibility of social-economic situation improvement in the next few years amounted to 19.9% (Table 1), which caused a growth of expectation index from -30.2 up to -16.4.

Despite the decrease of people's real incomes in January-April 2016 by 6.9% comparatively to the same

Table 1

Dynamics of answering the question: "How is the socio-economic situation going to change in Belarus within the next few years?", %

Variant of answer	06'11	06'15	09'15	12'15	03'16	06'16
It is going to improve	11.9	21.7	20.6	16.5	12.7	19.9
It is not going to change	20.3	36.0	37.2	40.2	34.3	37.1
It is going to become worse	55.5	36.5	36.2	36.4	42.9	36.3
EI*	-43.6	-14.8	-15.6	-19.9	-30.2	-16.4

* Expectation index (the difference between positive and negative answers)

Table 2

Dynamics of answering the question: "How has your personal financial standing changed for the last three months?", %

Variant of answer	06'11	06'15	09'15	12'15	03'16	06'16
It has improved	1.6	9.0	9.8	10.5	5.5	7.6
It has not changed	23.2	51.3	44.4	45.9	33.4	44.2
It has become worse	73.4	37.2	42.5	42.4	59.6	46.1
FSI*	-71.8	-28.2	-32.7	-31.9	-54.1	-38.5

* Financial standing index

More than once we've attracted your attention to the anomalously high level of dollarization of Belarusian mentality. This anomaly has a rational explanation: the

period of 2015, the most "material" of the social indices, the financial standing index demonstrated a noticeable growth (Table 2). It should be noted that the

share of Belarusians who mentioned an improvement of their financial standing increased insignificantly (+2.1 points). The increase of FSI happened mostly at the expense of 13.5-point decrease of the share of negative answers. This is an important moment in the dynamics of FSI. It testifies that at any moment people's perception of their financial well-being may switch from a positive trend to a negative one.

At the V All-Belarusian People's Assembly Alexander Lukashenko once again declared the continuity of "our course" and keeping the basis of the Belarusian development model. However, only 29.1 of Belarusians believe in the correctness of "our course" today. More than a half of respondents (57%) don't believe in it (Table 3).

In the upshot population doesn't have institutional opportunities which played an important adapting role in the course of the crisis in the nineties.

Price hike still out of competition

In the framework of the general trend to the improvement of social moods the share of positive answers to the question "Do you think that Belarusian economy is in crisis?" dropped by 6.9 points. Nevertheless, it is still abnormally high (Table 4).

Over the three months passed from the March survey the share of respondents believing in internal reasons of the crisis decreased by 6.2 points, which is quite significant (Table 5). At the same time the share

Table 3

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you think the state of things is developing in our country in the right or in the wrong direction in general?", %

Variant of answer	09'11	06'15	09'15	12'15	03'16	06'16
In the right direction	17.0	34.6	34.8	36.7	23.5	29.1
In the wrong direction	68.5	49.4	48.0	50.9	58.5	57.0
DA/NA	14.5	16.0	17.2	12.4	18.0	13.9
PCI*	-51.5	-14.8	-13.2	-14.2	-35.0	-27.9

* Policy correctness index

Table 4

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you think that Belarusian economy is in crisis?", %

Variant of answer	09'11	06'15	09'15	12'15	03'16	06'16
Yes	87.6	72.0	75.1	66.9	87.8	80.9
No	8.0	16.9	16.2	17.9	4.4	13.4
DA/NA	4.4	11.1	8.7	15.2	7.8	5.7

Table 5

Distribution of answers to the question: "If you agree that Belarusian economy is in crisis, then what are its main reasons?" depending on attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	03'16	06'16	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
			Trust	Don't trust
The reasons are external	30.7	27.8	42.6	13.5
The reasons are internal	51.9	45.7	19.2	71.6
DA/NA	17.4	26.6	38.2	14.9

Passive adaptation to crisis has its limit. Opportunities, present in the course of transformational crisis of the nineties, are almost exhausted today. Uncoordinated trade lost to trading networks and is unable to create any important number of jobs. There are no hopes for small business too. It is still cut off of investments, and also limited by the high number of administrative barriers, which appeared over the last years.

Informal employment is a product of the nineties. It had played an important role in the process of adaptation to the social stress. However, today its volume is balanced and adequate to the established structure of economy and labor market. In this relation it is highly unlikely that informal economic sector will react to the crisis by creating new jobs and playing a serious damping role.

of those who believe in external reasons also decreased by 3.1 points. In the result the share of respondents who didn't know how to answer this question exceeded one quarter! The main contribution to the growth of this share was done by Lukashenko's supporters: March – 23%, June – 38.2%. Among his opponents the share grew only by 4.8 points: March – 10.1%, June – 14.9%.

This "asymmetry" should apparently be explained by the activation of state propaganda before the V All-Belarusian People's Assembly. Over the years IISEPS surveys demonstrate that Lukashenko's supporters are much more inclined to react to mobilization appeals of the power than his opponents.

However, propaganda's ability to convince A. Lukashenko's supporters that black is white and

white is black significantly weakened at this stage of crisis. That is why respondents don't change their evaluations to the opposite ones under the influence of propaganda, but just join the share of those who don't know what to answer.

We've also registered a change in the top tier of the Table 6 in the answers to the question "Who is responsible for the present crisis in Belarus?" Despite the decrease of "responsibility ratings" of both A. Lukashenko and the government, the "victorious palms" go the head of state. His rating exceeds the government's by 6.7 points. Other "subjects" of Belarusian crisis (with the exception of the parliament) kept their ratings.

fluences people with a low level of incomes in the first place. However, IISEPS surveys do not register a linear dependency between the topicality of price hike and the level of incomes. Among respondents with the income below 1.7 million rubles in June 68.8% named inflation (price hike) as the most acute problem: 1.7-2.8 million rubles – 75.6%, 2.8-5.6 million rubles – 75.1%, over 5.6 million rubles – 63.9%.

Why Belarusians with the minimal incomes are less sensitive to the inflation in comparison with more well-to-do groups? Two explanations can be offered here, taking into account the fact that as a rule low incomes are specific to the representatives of peripheral social

Table 6

Dynamics of answering the question: "Who is responsible for the present crisis in Belarus?"*, %
(more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	09'11	12'13	09'15	03'16	06'16
The President	61.2	45.0	34.1	47.0	42.3
The government	41.3	42.0	40.5	48.3	35.6
The USA	16.3	15.5	15.9	16.7	18.6
Europe	12.0	11.8	21.5	17.5	17.7
Parliament	11.9	19.6	14.0	22.7	12.8
People	10.0	16.3	11.8	12.9	9.8
Russia	7.3	6.6	10.7	10.1	9.7
Opposition	5.0	13.1	6.6	8.6	10.5
DA	13.4	11.5	8.6	10.9	3.5

* The table is sorted by the first column

Table 7

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which of the following problems are the most acute for Belarus and its citizens today?", % (more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	06'15	06'16
Price hike	76.9	73.2
Unemployment	55.8	54.8
Production decline	55.8	47.6
Impoverishment of population	49.3	52.1
Violation of human rights	24.1	17.6
Bad medicine	23.0	27.6
Lack of law and order	16.9	15.8
Bad educational system	15.8	13.1
Corruption, bribery	15.1	20.1
Delinquency	10.8	8.9

It is not excluded that the reason for this change is related to the increase of retirement age in Belarus, validated by A. Lukashenko in the end of March. It couldn't influence the results of March survey since it was conducted in the first half of the month.

Among the most acute problems facing the country, price hike is still out of competition (Table 7). There is nothing surprising about it. In January-May 2016 Belarus again headed the list of countries with the highest consumer price hike among post-Soviet countries. These result are taken from the national statistics centers. Here are the top three countries: Belarus – 7%, Azerbaijan – 6.7%, and Ukraine – 5.2%.

Economists say that consumer inflation should be regarded as a kind of poverty tax, since price hike in-

fluences people with a low level of incomes, people living in villages). First, people with the mentioned socio-demographic characteristics are more susceptible to propaganda. Second, many of them are included in modern economy only marginally (they live off their vegetable gardens).

In June 2014 unemployment as an acute problem was mentioned only by each fourth Belarusian. In June 2015 and 2016 every second Belarusian mentioned it. This problem is especially topical for respondents in active age groups: 18-29 – 59.1%, 30-39 – 63.8%, 40-49 – 59.2%. Topicality of unemployment drops in the older age groups: 50-59 – 52.5%, 60+ – 41.9%.

It should be noted that men are more anxious about losing their jobs than women: 58.5% vs. 51.8%.

The lack of serious complaints against the educational system (13.1%) and law and order (15.8%) also testifies on the passive adaptation to the crisis, as these institutions allow to build active life strategies in the modern dynamic world.

To live to the retirement age

Alexander Lukashenko signed the decree on the increase of retirement age on April 11, 2016. This decree stipulates that starting from January 1, 2017 retirement will be gradually increased by 6 months until it reaches 63 years for men and 58 years for women. Before the document was signed, there were two conferences in March on the development of pension system.

Thus, on March 10 the head of state declared that final decision on the increase of retirement age will be taken after a wide discussion in society. Besides, he was obliged to admit that this decision was unpopular: "I'll be honest, according to my information (and I'm sure of it) we didn't reach an overwhelming majority of support to the increase of retirement age among our population. We are close to a half. And people respond to our offers, requests, slowly, but after we explain, educate, recommend, they understand what we are talking about. Belarusians are educated people".

However, in the course of June IISEPS survey we didn't succeed in discovering the "absolute majority" supporting the increase of retirement age (Table 8). On the contrary, we've registered an absolute majority of adversaries to the pension reform. Even among respondents trusting A. Lukashenko the share of support of retirement age increase is less than a half – 38.8%.

As for the youth (respondents aged between 18 and 29), who supposedly took calmly "these suggestions", the share of supporters of retirement age increase amounted to 14.9% in this age group. The same level of support of the pension initiative of Alexander Lukashenko was demonstrated by all age groups except for the oldest one (60+). But even among currently retired people, who can be considered as beneficiaries of the decree, only 37.9% pronounced in support of retirement age increase.

Owing to reasons, which don't need comments, the odds to be in the group of those who won't live to the retirement age are much higher for men than women. That is why the more decisive refusal to support the reform among the stronger sex looks quite logical: 14.4% vs. 22.8%.

As it follows from Table 9, only 15.1% of Belarusians agreed with A. Lukashenko's statement on the "absolute majority". Even among the head of state's

Table 8

Distribution of answers to the question: "Recently President Alexander Lukashenko has signed a decree on retirement age. According to this decree retirement age increases by 3 years (up to 58 years for women and up to 63 years for men). Which of the following statements regarding this decree do you agree with?", %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
Retirement age should have been increased in order to increase pensions	19.0	38.8	6.2
Retirement age should not have been increased, since many people won't live to it	70.5	48.7	88.4
DA/NA	10.5	12.5	5.4

Table 9

Distribution of answers to the question: "What is your attitude to President A. Lukashenko's statement that "absolute majority of our citizens are concordant with the retirement age increase"?", %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
I agree	15.1	31.5	4.1
I disagree	58.8	34.2	78.7
I don't care	17.7	22.1	12.4
DA/NA	8.4	12.2	4.8

15 days had gone by. This term, according to A. Lukashenko's information, was enough for the share of supporters of retirement age increase to grow from being "close to a half" up to "an absolute majority". The initiator of the reform especially noted the reaction of the youth: "Well done for our young people! They understand that it relates to them and employed people in the first place, but they took it calmly. I don't say they like it. But it happens, that you don't like something, but there is no escape, you need to go in this direction".

supporters this share amounted to less than one third: 10% among young people and 29.1% among older age groups.

Under the conditions of the economic crisis "the state for the people" began to actively declare its readiness to discuss with people fundamental decisions related to internal policy. In this respect the decision of retirement age increase should be regarded as a precedent. From the point of view of organizers, it should be considered as a success: there were no public objections, and the hidden diffuse dissatisfaction, regis-

tered by independent sociologists, was never taken into account by the head of state.

Stagnation at the nook of stability

We've already noted many times that at the heart of demand for changes lies, in the first place, the dissatisfaction of Belarusians with their current financial well-being. That is why the relative stabilization in economy in the second quarter of the year didn't significantly influence the number of supporters and opponents of changes.

In the first and in the second column of Table 10 you can see the historical low and high of respondents' answers. Comparatively to the "fat" year 2006 the number of supporters and opponents of changes changed almost two-fold. On the contrary, comparatively to 2011 the changes are minimal.

Table 10

Dynamics of answering the question: "What's more important for you today: maintaining of the current situation in the country or changing it?", %

Variant of answer	02'06	12'11	06'14	09'15	03'16	06'16
Changing of the situation is more important	53.4	18.0	38.3	33.3	24.7	25.2
Maintaining of the situation is more important	37.8	70.1	52.1	52.7	67.3	65.5
DA/NA	8.8	11.9	9.6	14.0	8.0	9.3

Table 11

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, which of the opinions better describes the degree of social tension in Belarusian society?", %

Variant of answer	06'96	04'06	12'10	06'16
There are no social tensions and conflicts in Belarusian society	16.3	35.9	27.2	26.3
Social tension is present in Belarusian society, but it's less important than in Russia and other countries of the CIS	61.5	39.0	49.3	42.2
Social tension is quite high in Belarusian society, and it tends to grow further	19.0	17.1	16.8	27.2
DA/NA	3.2	8.0	6.7	4.3

Among respondents with monthly income below 1.7 million rubles the share of supporters of maintaining of the current situation amounted to 11.2% (2.3 times lower than average). It would seem that with the transition from the group of respondents with monthly income between 1.7 and 2.8 million rubles to the group with monthly income above 5.6 million rubles the share of conservators should grow successively. However, in reality there is a "plateau" limited by statistical error near the average value of 27.5%.

Dissatisfaction with material position is the main but not the only reason influencing Belarusians' conservatism, as changes are not always for the better. That is why many people prefer to have a bird in the hand than two in the wood, and there is nothing surprising in the fact, that women follow this principle more often than men (30.4% vs. 18.9%), people older than 60 – than young people aged 18-29 (46.2% vs. 17.7%), and people with primary education – than people with higher education (42.7% vs. 19.3%).

As for Belarusians sharing opposite political views, A. Lukashenko's supporters prevail over his opponents in their conservatism by 13.5 times (54.7% vs. 4.1%).

Table 11 provides for evaluation of the changes in public opinion regarding the social tension in society over two decades. The main difference of current evaluations from those of 1996 is polarization. In June the variant of answer "Social tension is quite high in Belarusian society, and it tends to grow further" was chosen by 27.2% of respondents (A. Lukashenko's supporters – 7.5%, opponents – 46.6%). This is by 8.2 points more than in the year of the second constitutional referendum and by 10 points more than in the "fat" years of the third and the fourth presidential elections.

Increase of polarization in the evaluations of social tension is an important characteristic of social opinion on the current stage of development of the Belarusian

model.

Belarus is a nook of stability in the anxious modern world. Stability is more important than material well-being. These are the slogans that Belarusian power attempts to use nowadays to communicate with the society. But in the split society acceptance of such slogans by supporters and opponents of the power may differ by an order of magnitude (Table 12).

What is perceived as stability by some people, looks like stagnation for others. Unfortunately, today's alternative for both stability and stagnation is not development but degradation, which is registered by the official economic statistics.

"People had exhausted the limit of revolutions and tragedies in the last century". A. Lukashenko reminded this to the people and the world during the V All-Belarusian People's Assembly. But revolutions are never made "on order". The most famous theoretical and practical expert of revolutions V. Lenin understood it very well a century ago. As a rule, the choice between evolutionary and revolutionary ways of development is not made on the orders of politicians. Never-

theless, in no society majority ever strives for violent changes purposely.

Belarusian society is not an exception in this case. In June 2016 idea of changes at the expense of street protests enjoyed popularity only among 14.7% of respondents (Table 13). This is almost 1.5 time as much as during the patriotic euphoria which reduced the acuteness of current economic problems.

Global trend

In June A. Lukashenko's rating changed in opposite senses comparatively to March. Electoral rating gained 2.2 points, while trust rating lost 3.1 points (Tables 14-15). These changes should be regarded as insignificant, so we can speak about a stabilization of public

Table 12

Distribution of answers to the question: "Recently President Alexander Lukashenko said that "Amid the current troubled situation Belarus is rightly considered as a nook of stability". But many people think that "Belarusian stability is closer to stagnation, and there is no development in the country". What do you think about it?", %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
I agree that "amid the current troubled situation Belarus is rightly considered as a nook of stability"	33.4	65.5	6.3
I agree that "our stability is closer to stagnation, and there is no development in the country"	53.5	26.0	80.4
DA/NA	13.1	8.5	13.3

Table 13

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which variant of changes do you consider most realistic and desirable in Belarus?", %

Variant of answer	06'14	06'15	06'16
Elections	50.1	49.0	44.1
Republican referendum	29.4	27.9	26.2
Street protests	8.0	9.9	14.7
DA/NA	12.5	13.2	15.0

Table 14

Dynamics of electoral rating of President A. Lukashenko*, %

Date	12'13	03'14	03'15	06'15	09'15	12'15	03'16	06'16
Rating	34.8	39.8	34.2	38.6	45.7	33.3	27.3	29.5

* Electoral rating is the percentage of votes, which a politician received in answers to an open question "If presidential elections were held tomorrow, for whom would you vote?"

Table 15

Dynamics of trust rating of President A. Lukashenko*, %

Variant of answer	12'13	03'14	03'15	06'15	09'15	12'15	03'16	06'16
Trust	37.7	45.9	48.8	49.0	47.0	45.4	41.7	38.6
Don't trust	47.5	44.1	39.7	39.1	37.1	41.9	47.4	48.0
DA	14.8	10.0	11.5	11.9	15.9	12.7	10.9	13.4

* Trust rating is the percentage of support in the answers to the question "Do you trust the President?"

Economic crises boost demand for changes. According to Belarusian opposition, this should lead to an increase of protest moods. Table 13 results do not contradict this opinion. However, one should not be deluded, taking the growth of diffuse dissatisfaction for real readiness to protest.

Increase of the number of the so-called change supporters is an indicator of the level of satisfaction with the current situation in the atomized society unable for collective actions.

opinion on the actions of "the only politician" as the head of state on the first year of his fifth term. This stabilization does not contradict to the decrease in acuity of perception of the economic crisis by Belarusians, registered in March.

Changes of public opinion registered in the course of quarter surveys are, as a rule, media ripples, or ripples caused by current changes in economy. The big is seen from a distance. Table 16 results allow us to see

this "big". Over the last 10 years, public opinion drastically re-evaluated A. Lukashenko's "pivots".

In full compliance with the theory of the classical politologist M. Weber, there was a routinization of charisma of the "nation-wide-elected president". From a politician, relying on people (rural people, pensioners and common people), he transformed into a politician, relying mainly on bureaucracy. A formal decrease of the importance of the military, the MIA and the KGB is probably related to their success in suppression of dissidence and public protests. As a result, their actions disappeared from the front pages of mass media.

It should be noted that Table 16 reflects changes in public opinion, but not actual changes in A. Lukashenko's actions as the head of state.

fold. This is the global trend, "cleaned" from the influence of local events. There are no reasons for this trend to turn backwards today.

The state is affected by those who are close to the first person

Despite the seemingly successful assimilation of market-related social practices (e.g. those related to consummation), Belarusian society in XXI century kept its class-based nature. The term "fairness" is the basis term in class societies. In particular, allocation of resources is considered fair when it corresponds to the ranking in the class hierarchy.

We've noted earlier that from the point of view of

Table 16

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, what does President Alexander Lukashenko mainly relies on?", % (more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	08'06	06'16	Difference
Presidential hierarchy line	37.0	54.4	17.4
State officials	20.5	32.1	11.8
Directors of big enterprises	13.5	17.4	3.9
Businessmen	4.5	5.5	1.0
Specialists	9.9	9.2	-0.7
The military, the MIA, the KGB	48.6	47.1	-1.0
Cultural and scientific elite	8.3	4.4	-3.9
Rural people	30.2	11.5	-18.7
Pensioners	41.4	21.8	-19.4
Common people	34.2	8.2	-26.0

* The table is sorted by the last column

Table 17

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which statement about corruption in Belarus do you agree with?", %

Variant of answer	06'15	06'16
A. Lukashenko will succeed in fighting against corruption after a serious purge of high-ranked officials and after introduction of more serious penalties for such crimes	27.8	25.3
A. Lukashenko will fight against corruption, but it is not likely that he will succeed, as corruption in Belarus is ineradicable	29.5	26.5
It is difficult for A. Lukashenko to fight against corruption as he depends on corrupted officials himself	22.8	23.8
A. Lukashenko won't really fight against corruption, because he is interested in it in one or another way	15.9	21.4
DA/NA	4.0	3.1

22 years ago A. Lukashenko emerged as an undeniable leader of the first presidential race due to the fact, among others, that he "without fearing conspiracies and attacks, was disclosing corruption among high-level officials" (this is a quote from the first official biography of A. Lukashenko). Today, however, only one of four Belarusians believes in his ability to achieve success in the fight against corruption (Table 17). The share of pessimistic evaluations amounts to almost three quarters.

In 2006 average value of A. Lukashenko's electoral rating amounted to 55.6%. In the first half of 2016 it amounts to 28.4%. The decrease is almost double-

social opinion A. Lukashenko mainly relies on the presidential hierarchy line (54.4%), security agencies (47.1) and state officials (17.4%).

This hierarchy of "pivots" is quite in accord with the hierarchy of answers to the question "How do you evaluate material position of the following groups of population in Belarus?" (Table 18). The familiar service class people take leadership in the rank. It's logical if you take into account that in class-based societies resources are allocated under the principle "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work". In the framework of this logic the last to receive material goods are pensioners, rural and common people.

Table 18

Distribution of answers to the question: "How do you evaluate material position of the following groups of population in Belarus?"*, %

Variant of answer	Good	Average	Bad
Presidential hierarchy line	82.3	14.7	2.7
State officials	71.3	24.4	3.9
Directors of large enterprises	64.9	29.3	5.5
The military, the CIA, the KGB	52.0	39.2	8.4
Businessmen	47.5	37.7	14.5
Cultural and scientific elite	26.1	51.3	22.2
Specialists	17.4	56.3	25.9
Pensioners	7.2	39.0	53.6
Rural people	6.2	46.1	47.3
Common people	6.2	41.7	51.7

* The table is sorted by the first column

Table 19

Distribution of answers to the question: "Does the life of the following groups of population corresponds to their contribution to society?"*, %

Variant of answer	They live better than they deserve to	They live just like they deserve to	They live worse than they deserve to
Presidential hierarchy line	73.2	23.3	3.4
State officials	61.9	31.9	6.1
Directors of large enterprises	48.8	41.8	9.2
The military, the CIA, the KGB	31.8	54.3	13.8
Businessmen	30.0	52.3	17.4
Cultural and scientific elite	13.2	57.4	29.3
Specialists	8.3	54.0	37.5
Common people	5.6	37.2	56.9
Rural people	4.6	45.1	50.2
Pensioners	3.3	28.3	68.3

* The table is sorted by the first column

In June 1996 the rating of material position was headed by businessmen (85.3%), presidential hierarchy line (80.3%) and directors of state enterprises (77.9%). Over two decades the hierarchy line kept its leading position, while businessmen's rating dropped by 37.8 points (!), and that of directors of state enterprises – by 13.

These dynamics have an explanation. The middle of the nineties is the time when it seemed that social administrative system (Soviet class system) was being replaced by capitalistic system, where businessmen and directors of large enterprises will take the leading role. However, these expectations failed to come true. The state, debilitated by perestroika, rose from the ashes like a phoenix, and state functionaries won back their privileged position in the hierarchy.

Answering the question of Table 18, respondents proceeded from their perception of real distribution of material wealth between the classes. Let us remind you, that the real distribution is carried out by the power in its own interest. Table 19 demonstrates the desired distribution from the point of view of respondents, i.e. common people. Naturally, the distribution of evaluations is mirror-like: those who are well-paid don't

deserve it, and vice versa.

The differences in evaluations of classes according to material criterion may be 20-fold and higher. Such a significant difference is not registered in the evaluations of "respect" towards different classes (Table 20). The familiar dependency from Tables 18-19 is absent as well.

In the upshot we have a country where there are no respected social groups. Representatives of security agencies are leading here with a small advantage. This hierarchy of social respect leaves little chance for a successful economic development in times of globalization.

The lack of authority doesn't mean that there is no impact on people's lives (Table 21). Judging by the last column, the impact directly depends on closeness to the first person of the state. Presidential hierarchy line is naturally out of competition (46.7%), and common people are on the opposite end of the scale.

Twenty years ago presidential hierarchy line was out of competition as well (39.9%), but the second place was taken by journalists (31.1%) – above the security forces and directors of large enterprises. In 2016 journalists weren't included in the questionnaire, and this

Table 20**Distribution of answers to the question: "Are the following groups of population respected in society?"*, %**

Variant of answer	They are highly respected	They enjoy certain respect	They are not respected
Rural people	8.3	60.8	30.7
Common people	5.7	64.5	29.5
State officials	15.8	56.4	27.6
Presidential hierarchy line	18.8	55.3	25.7
Businessmen	12.2	67.0	20.4
Pensioners	13.3	64.8	21.7
The military, the CIA, the KGB	24.3	56.7	18.7
Directors of large enterprises	20.6	65.6	13.4
Specialists	14.5	72.4	12.8
Cultural and scientific elite	18.5	68.7	12.6

* The table is sorted by the last column

Table 21**Distribution of answers to the question: "Which impact do the following groups of population have over the life of people?"*, %**

Variant of answer	No impact	Average impact	Great impact
Presidential hierarchy line	14.9	38.2	46.7
State officials	21.2	44.4	34.0
The military, the CIA, the KGB	23.4	47.3	29.2
Directors of large enterprises	23.6	51.3	24.9
Cultural and scientific elite	34.2	50.7	14.6
Specialists	34.2	51.1	14.2
Businessmen	35.3	52.0	12.4
Rural people	48.0	39.6	12.3
Common people	58.8	34.9	6.0
Pensioners	59.5	35.1	5.1

* The table is sorted by the last column

fact reflects the change of impact of the "fourth power" in the "state for the people".

Allocation of resources is the substance of social life in a class-based society. Classes, responsible for allocation, are naturally privileged. Such a system can maintain stability over decades, but it is unable to reproduce itself widely, and this is registered in practice.

One more threat for collective identity

"The state for the people, justice, protection of honest men, – said A. Lukashenko at the V All-Belarusian People's Assembly, – are what was and is at the heart of the Belarusian sovereignty".

The main peculiarity of the Belarusian society (or people, as A. Lukashenko puts it) is the split, as ISEPS surveys demonstrates it. That is why there is nothing surprising in the fact that not all Belarusians perceive the Belarusian state as their state.

Only 30% of Belarusians unambiguously consider Belarus as theirs (Table 22). In 2014-2015, amid the patriotic euphoria provoked by Russian TV-propaganda, the share of positive answers exceeded its baseline by 7-10 points. But after the exhaustion of

mobilization effect in 2016 everything came back to norm.

It is natural that perception of the state is politically charged. In June 2016 61.6% of A. Lukashenko's supporters and only 5.6% of his opponents considers the state as theirs (66.9% vs. 13.2% accordingly in June 2015). Belarusian state in the first place belongs to people with primary education (69.8%) and for people over 60 years old (54%). They were the primary audience of the V All-Belarusian People's Assembly which was held in Minsk on June 22-23 under the motto "Movement is force!" The "program of development instead stagnation; program of the future instead of the past; program of actions instead of expectations" was adopted during the Assembly.

"The state, that's me". The point of view formulated by Louis XIV didn't lose its topicality in modern Belarus. In June 2015 41.2% of population recognized Belarusian state as theirs, and almost the same share of respondents agreed that concentration of power in A. Lukashenko's hands is favorable for the country (Table 23). The former share dropped by 11.7 points in June 2016, and it lead to a symmetrical decrease of the latter share as well.

The main characteristic of the "state for the people" is its ability to help people in their moments of need. 20 years ago 82% of Belarusians thought so (Table 24). Thanks to their support A. Lukashenko won the first and the last democratic presidential elections in 1994. Thanks to their silent consent in 1996 the Constitution, stipulating in fact the cancellation of power division principle, was accepted.

Its physical implementation are state officials, inclined to pass their group interests for national ones.

Table 25 results allows us to assess the changes in Belarusians' perception of "Sovereign's people" over the last 20 years. It should be admitted that the changes are positive. This one of the reasons of the political longevity of the "last dictator of Europe". Let us remind you, that according to A. Lukashenko's definition, 1996

Table 22

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which of the following statements on Belarusian state, built under the rule of A. Lukashenko, do you agree with?", %

Variant of answer	06'13	06'14	06'15	06'16
It is my state, it protects my interests	33.2	39.1	41.2	29.5
It is only partially my state, it doesn't protect my interests enough	45.2	43.2	43.8	47.1
It is not my state, it does not protect my interests and I do not trust it	15.5	12.0	9.7	15.2
DA/NA	6.1	5.7	5.3	8.2

Table 23

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, is the fact that now almost all of the state power is concentrated in the hands of A. Lukashenko, favorable for Belarus or there is nothing good for the country in it?", %

Variant of answer	09'09	09'10	06'11	12'12	06'15	06'16
It's favorable for Belarus	44.4	44.1	26.2	33.3	40.1	31.3
There is nothing good for the country in it	36.0	38.5	59.1	49.9	47.8	55.5
DA/NA	19.6	17.4	14.7	16.8	12.1	13.2

Table 24

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which of the following opinions do you agree with?", %

Variant of answer	06'96	06'16
The government is responsible for people's well-being and is obliged to help people in the moments of need	82.0	65.2
People are responsible for their well-being and should solve their issues by themselves	16.5	29.5
NA	1.5	5.3

Standing on the tribune of the V All-Belarusian People's Assembly, A. Lukashenko expressed his gratitude to the participants of the first Assembly: "I know there are "old-timers" who were present on the I All-Belarusian People's Assembly and who remember the times and the reasons which pushed me to gather this assembly. <...> If it were not for you, for your colleagues who were there, <...>, if you wouldn't have said the strong "no" to the collapse, I emphasize it again, we wouldn't be here now".

Over the past 20 years, paternalist abilities of the "state for the people" were significantly reduced, but even today majority of Belarusians continue to view the state as a social security agency. Nevertheless, despite their own wish, almost every third Belarusian is obliged to live according to the real life, that severe real life where the problems of personal well-being should be solved on one's own.

It would be interesting to know if the supporters of the motto "The state for the people" realize that thereby they draw a parallel between the modern Belarusian state and the isolated from society Marxist state. From Marx's viewpoint state is an institution above society.

was the year of collapse. And we agree with this definition. Current situation in Belarus, despite the expanding crisis, is still far from the 20-years-old situation, and this determines the difference in evaluations.

Collapse of the USSR and of the Soviet system spawned a mass cultural shock and the loss of collective identity in the beginning of the nineties. Ethnic identity was massively used as life-buoy ring on the territories of former Soviet republics. But its mobilization effect in the country, described by the classic of Belarusian literature A. Adamovich as "the Vendee of perestroika", turned out to be insufficient.

Presidential election 1994 in Belarus can be regarded as an attempt of "majority", comprised of the so-called Homo Sovieticus, to restore their habitual habitat, the only habitat where it is possible to reproduce Soviet collective identity. Naturally, Belarusians couldn't step into the same river twice. Communistic ideology died, and the role of the state as a source of collective identity became more important.

However, under the conditions of a split society, it's not possible to achieve national consensus, based on the belief in paternalistic abilities of the state. "Crimeaisours" and the subsequent armed conflict in

the East of Ukraine increased the share of Belarusians believing that the state is theirs. But the mobilization effect, caused by the patriotic excitement, was completely exhausted by the beginning of 2016. That is why the state, obliged to reduce its social commitments almost daily, cannot be perceived as theirs by those people who are unable to survive under the current half-market conditions. This means that the collective identity of the "majority" is once again under a threat.

Message-2016

Belarusians' attention to the annual messages of the head of state oscillates in a pretty wide range. Over the last 10 years it achieved its high only in the year of the third presidential election (69%). It's low coincides with the first year of the fifth term (49%) after the exhaustion of the mobilization resource of "Crimeaisours" (Table 26).

Table 25

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to you, how people get to top-ranking position now (not only in production, but also in governmental structures, science, business)?", %
(more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	06'96	06'16
According to professional qualities	17.4	22.3
For money	43.0	19.0
With the help of connections	69.6	50.9
Other	4.0	6.8

Table 26

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you know that President A. Lukashenko delivered an annual message to Belarusian people and National Assembly on the 29th of April?", %

Variant of answer	06'06	06'08	06'10	06'12	06'13	06'14	06'15	06'16
Yes	69	50	55	63	59	61	61	49
No	31	46	41	34	39	38	39	51

Awareness of the Message may serve as an indicator of interest of different socio-demographic groups to the processes outside the narrow frames of everyday life. In the oldest age group (60+) it turned out to be twice as high as in the youngest (18-29) – 67.1% vs. 32.6%. Men, although insignificantly, are more interested than women – 52.1 vs. 47%. The inverse relationship between the awareness and the level of education comes as a surprise – primary education – 70.5%, higher education – 54.2%. Partially this phenomenon might be explained by the age of respondents: among people with primary education prevail elderly people, and watching TV is their main pastime.

Table 27 data provides for evaluation of Belarusians' attitude to the most outstanding statements made by A. Lukashenko during the Message.

There is only one statement that majority of respondents agreed with (both the head of state's supporters and opponents): "The main treasure today and tomorrow is brains. Science, innovations, not what God put into the ground". In essence, this is a banality, and it would have been strange if Belarusians hadn't supported this.

The reference to external factors as the main reason for slowing down of economy development is very close to the symbolic 50% support. At the same time, the difference between A. Lukashenko's supporters and opponents is 4-fold.

The record-high difference (10-fold) between the evaluations of politically opposed groups of respondents was registered in relation to the statement on state policy, which supposedly has concern for people at its heart. We've mentioned multiple times that, in the course of almost two decades, Belarusian state was building communication with society on the grounds of contract "loyalty in exchange for incomes growth". Within the framework of this contract loyal supporters of A. Lukashenko definitely felt this "concern for people" from the state.

However, third year running, the state is obliged to abandon past social commitments. Majority of A. Lukashenko's supporters have not realized it yet by

inertia.

Five of eight statements, made during the Message-2016, were agreed with by less than a third of respondents. Both the author of the Message and our respondents make their evaluation basing on real life. It's just that real life on the different sides of the fence of "The Palace of Independence" is built upon diametrically opposite principles.

Voting, caring, discussing

Voting in elections is the indisputable leader of popularity among modern types of popular political activities for Belarusians. For example, in June 2016 65.5% of respondents confirmed that they take part in elections (Table 28). According to European standards it's a solid figure, but it's significantly lower than the official one. Particularly, according to the CEC, turnout of presidential elections in 2015 amounted to 87.2%.

22.3% of respondents attentively followed the information on political events in June 2016. It is lower than the figure of the previous year by 12.4 points. Such a significant decrease of interest to political in-

formation is another proof of the exhaustion of mobilization effect, provoked by the events in Ukraine. For the same reason the share of respondents discussing political events with friends dropped from 44.5% down to 30.9% in a year (-13.6 points).

The habit to vote is one of the important components of Soviet legacy. That is why the older the respondents are the more actively they vote. For the outmost age groups (under 29 and after 60) the difference in June 2016 amounted to 21.8 points – 55.4% vs. 77.2%. Taking into account age structure of supporters and opponents of A. Lukashenko, electoral activities of the former is higher than of the latter – 71.7% vs. 59%.

Electoral activity of Belarusians, registered in Table 28, is confirmed by the answers to the question of Table 29. Three months prior to the voting day, slightly more than half of respondents declared their readiness to participate in elections (67.6% supporters, 41.2% opponents of A. Lukashenko). Every fourth respondents answered that they didn't take the final decision yet. This group of respondents constitutes a reserve for turnout increase.

Out of three statements made by A. Lukashenko in relation to the parliamentary elections in September, only one ("Belarusian electoral law is not worse than in other countries where elections were accepted by the international structures") draw agreement from more

Table 27

Distribution of answers to the question: "How do you relate to the following statements, which A. Lukashenko made during the message?" depending on the level of trust to the head of state, %

Variant of answer	Agree	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
All necessary decisions for economy development were made by the power, now it's time to implement them	31.1	73.2	17.2
Major role in slowing down of economy development was played by external factors.	45.8	80.6	19.1
State institutions can create 50 thousand new jobs annually	30.5	68.1	21.7
The main treasure today and tomorrow is brains. Science, innovations, not what God put into the ground.	64.0	69.7	58.4
The state defends rights, propriety and dignity of all entrepreneurs who run their businesses honestly.	32.5	65.8	8.4
Belarus takes the top spot in the world-wide rating of access to medical care.	29.6	50.6	14.8
Today Belarus is the mainstay of security in the region.	42.7	75.5	15.6
At the heart of state policy lays concern for people, for improvement of their well-being and standards of living.	32.9	67.6	6.3

Table 28

Dynamics of answering the question: "If you are interested in politics, how do you express your interest?", % (more than one answer is possible)

Variant of answer	03'09	06'15	06'16
I take part in elections	48.9	68.5	65.5
I follow attentively the information on political events	31.0	34.7	22.3
I discuss political events with my friends	28.0	44.5	30.9
I take part in political actions, meetings, strikes	2.4	3.6	4.1
I take part in organizing and conducting of election campaigns	2.1	3.7	5.2
I sign letters, petitions	1.5	2.7	5.2
I participate in events of a political party (movement)	1.1	—*	3.0
I am a member of a political party (movement)	1.0	2.4	2.7
I'm not interested in politics at all	26.5	—*	7.2

* These variants were omitted

As for the interest to politics (gathering information and discussing it), it is significantly higher among the head of state's opponents – 27.4% vs. 17.8% (+9.6 points) and 33.9% vs 26.5% (+7.4 points). The reason for this is the high level of education among A. Lukashenko's opponents.

The other types of political activities, requiring personal responsible actions from respondents, don't enjoy popularity in the atomized Belarusian society.

than a half of respondents (Table 30). However, there is electoral law and there is a practice of applying it, and for the last two decades this practice is connected to the name of L. Yermoshina, the head of the CEC. Only 38.4% agree that elections in Belarus are carried out in "in the absolutely democratic atmosphere". This fact makes us doubt the legitimacy of the future deputies of the National Assembly.

Answering the direct question "Do you believe that these elections will be free and just?", 38.1% of respondents gave a positive answer (36.8% in June

The readiness to vote in parliamentary elections in September was declared by 45.3% of youth (18-29) and by 69.7% of elderly people (60+), by 75% of Bela

Table 29

Dynamics of answering the question: "Will you vote in parliamentary elections 2016?", %

Variant of answer	06'08	09'08	06'12	06'16
Yes	53.0	61.2	50.7	51.8
No	18.4	14.9	19.4	19.6
I don't know yet	27.4	23.5	29.9	25.0

Table 30

Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you agree with the following statements of President Alexander Lukashenko made in connection to the next parliamentary election on September 11?" depending on attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
Belarusian electoral law is not worse than in other countries where elections were accepted by the international structures	51.2	83.4	24.1
People's will, according to the hands-on experience, will be expressed in the absolutely democratic atmosphere	38.4	64.4	20.2
Only worthy representatives of work collectives, political parties and social associations will join the electoral committees	45.1	71.0	22.7

Table 31

Dynamics of answering the question: "Which candidate would you prefer to vote for?", %

Variant of answer	06'08	09'08	06'12	06'16
For an opponent of Lukashenko	17.7	19.6	28.2	26.4
For a supporter of Lukashenko	39.6	43.5	27.6	25.0
For another candidate	31.4	21.9	27.4	24.5
DA/NA	11.3	15.0	16.8	24.3

2012), 36.1% – a negative one (39.6%), and 25.8% of respondents didn't know what to say (23.6%).

The third statement of A. Lukashenko ("Only worthy representatives of work collectives, political parties and social associations will join the electoral committees") did not receive support from half of respondents as well. The soundness of mass doubt was confirmed on June 27 during the formation of regional and territorial electoral committees.

Political preferences of Belarusian voters are reflected in Table 31. Despite the economic crisis, they didn't change much comparatively to June 2012, and the answers are divided almost equally between the candidates loyal to the power, oppositional and other (independent) candidates. However, there is no doubt that in the result of elections the overwhelming majority of electors will make the "right" choice, and only A. Lukashenko's supporters will be elected to the National Assembly.

Validity of our estimate is partly confirmed by the answers to the question of Table 32. In the state for the people, where popular rule is regarded as the backbone principle, only 37.5% of adult population agrees that their votes influence the results of elections (62.3% of supporters and 18.8% of opponents of A. Lukashenko).

rusians with primary education and by 50% – with higher. Thus, the future of Belarus (let's factor out the specific way of counting the votes for a moment) is defined by electors with the minimal ability to become active participants of creating the future. Social policy of "the state for the people" is oriented to satisfying their interests.

Two shows

All-Belarusian People's Assembly (popular veche) is the supreme implementation of popular rule. This is the official version. The first Assembly was held on October 19-20, 1996. Let us remind you the heading of A. Lukashenko's report: "Only the People Have the Right to Decide Their Fate". By way of historical reference, it should be noted that veche was a popular assembly of town or tribal community in ancient and medieval Slavic countries. It was efficient under the condition that each participant could hear herald's screaming. Thus, veche was a pre-state power institution.

Despite propaganda, in June 2016 only 28% of Belarusians share the official point of view on All-Belarusian People's Assembly. Every second respondent perceived the popular veche as a show (Table 33).

The choice between these opinions significantly depends on education and age of respondents: primary –

67.4/12.6%, higher – 20.9/59.5%; 18-29 – 18.9/54.3%, 60+ – 54.3/23.1%.

Table 34 results allow to evaluate Belarusians' attitude to the Congress of Democratic Forces, organized

of the Congress' evaluations among A. Lukashenko's opponents.

To understand the answers to the question of Table 35 we'll need the definition of democracy by Vol-

Table 32

Dynamics of answering the question: "Do you believe that results of elections depend on your vote?", %

Variant of answer	03'08	06'12	06'16
No, they don't	41.1	54.5	45.5
Yes, they do	50.6	36.7	37.5
DA/NA	8.3	8.8	16.9

Table 33

Distribution of answers to the question: "The V All-Belarusian People's Assembly will be held on June 22-23. Which of the following opinions on All-Belarusian People's Assemblies do you share?" depending on attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
This is the supreme implementation of popular rule	28.0	58.1	7.0
This is the power's "show" for the people	49.2	20.8	76.4
DA/NA	22.8	21.1	16.6

Table 34

Distribution of answers to the question: "Part of oppositional leaders held another Congress of Democratic Forces in May. Which of the following opinions on Congresses of Democratic Forces do you share?" depending on attitude to A. Lukashenko, %

Variant of answer	All respondents	Attitude to A. Lukashenko	
		Trust	Don't trust
This is the supreme expression of people's disagreement with the policy of the power	28.2	22.8	37.2
This is the opposition's "show" for the people	44.9	55.7	36.7
DA/NA	26.9	21.5	26.1

Table 35

Dynamics of answering the question: "What would you do with the political forces, whose activities are not contrary to the law, but, according to your opinion, are detrimental to the interests of Belarus?", %

Variant of answer	06'96	06'16
Ban their activities	41.0	28.8
Restrict opportunities to popularize their ideas and convictions on radio, TV and in newspapers	16.9	21.0
Restrict opportunities to organize public actions (meetings, marches, demonstrations)	11.3	15.2
Grant equal rights as compared to other forces	24.8	27.5
NA	6.0	7.4

in May by the leaders of Belarusian opposition, according to the same criteria. Judging by all respondents (the first column), the difference is insignificant (and it's in favor of the Congress): 49.2% of respondents view the Assembly as a show, and 44.9% view the Congress as a show.

Naturally, by breaking the answers down according to politically opposed groups, we see an inverse relationship. A. Lukashenko's supporters actively reject the variant, which they actively supported when it was related to the Assembly, when it is related to the Congress. It should be noted, however, that the differentiation of answers in the case of the Congress is noticeably lower. The reason for this lies in the almost equality

taire, the French philosopher of XVIII: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it".

This understanding of democracy is shared by only 27.5% of modern Belarusians. Over two decades this share increased by only 2.7 points, which is below statistical error. In all fairness it should be noted that the share of the first variant, the most brutal one ("Ban their activities") dropped by 12.2 points over the same period of time.

Nevertheless, the registered stability of Belarusians' perceptions of democracy permits us to raise a point regarding the reasons of these perception's peculiarity. What is the chicken and what is the egg in this case?

Is this peculiarity reproduced by virtue of state propaganda, or does the final design of the state itself, defined on 1996 referendum, result from this peculiarity?

The share of supporters of integration with Russia also increased over the last quarter (Table 37).

Table 36

Dynamics of answering the question: "If there was a referendum on Belarus joining the EU, how would you vote?", %

Variant of answer	09'08	03'09	03'10	03'11	12'12	12'13	09'14	09'15	12'15	03'16	06'16
For	26.7	34.9	36.2	48.6	38.9	35.9	25.0	27.5	19.8	23.4	27.5
Against	51.9	36.3	37.2	30.5	37.6	34.6	50.3	51.9	56.1	53.9	50.3

Table 37

Dynamics of answering the question: "If a referendum on the integration of Belarus and Russia was held today, what would be your choice?", %

Variant of answer	12'08	03'09	03'10	12'11	12'12	12'13	12'14	12'15	03'16	06'16
For	35.7	33.1	32.1	29.0	28.7	23.9	23.9	29.7	24.8	29.3
Against	38.8	43.2	44.5	42.9	47.5	51.4	58.4	51.5	52.4	52.0

Table 38

Dynamics of answering the question: "If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?", %

Variant of answer	12'08	12'09	12'10	12'11	12'12	12'13	12'14	12'15	03'16	06'16
Integration with the RF	46.0	42.3	38.1	41.4	37.7	36.6	44.9	53.5	48.0	42.0
Joining the EU	30.1	42.1	38.0	39.1	43.4	44.6	34.2	25.1	31.2	34.0
DA/NA	23.9	15.6	23.9	19.5	18.9	18.8	20.9	24.1	20.8	24.0

In June 2016 only 6.5% of supporters and 47.9% of opponents of Lukashenko agreed to grant equal rights to all sides. The latter share is 7.4 times as high as the former. Nevertheless, it is still less than a half. This is the reality of Belarusian cultural matrix, and people, who claim to be real politicians, should take it into consideration.

If the war starts tomorrow

Over the second quarter of the current year the share of European integration supporters increased insignificantly – by 4 percentage points (Table 36).

It's worth a reminder that in February the EU cancelled sanctions against Belarus, and the normalization of relations between Belarus and the EU entered a new phase. It might be supposed that it was this factor that determined the improvement in attitude towards the EU, which was also reflected in the growth of pro-European moods. Table 36 also demonstrates the growth of pro-European moods during the previous "honeymoon" in 2008-2010. It should be noted, however, that back then these moods were growing quicker and the share of European integration opponents was decreasing. Now the changes are quite insignificant.

It should be noted that the growth of pro-European moods over the last quarter happened from a very low level: in the midst of the "cold war" between Belarus and Europe in 2012-2013 the shares of "Euro-Belarusians" were much higher than now, during a thaw in relations.

So the supposition that current shift is a long-term trend can be confirmed or rejected only in the future.

This shift could have been caused by the 2-billion-dollar credit, given to Belarus by Russia via the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development, and by the recent visit of President V. Putin to Minsk.

However, the growth of pro-Russian moods doesn't look convincing in view of the answer to the "either-or" question, when respondents were supposed to make a choice between the two ways of integration (Table 38).

Table 37 registered an increase in pro-Russian moods by 5 percentage points. Table 38 registered their decrease by almost the same value. At the same time, the growth of pro-European moods looks more coordinated as it is confirmed by both Table 36 and Table 38.

Another criterion for geopolitical orientations of Belarusians are the answers to the questions on their attitude to the arms buildup of NATO and Russia near the Western and Eastern borders of Belarus, and on their position in case of a hypothetical conflict between NATO and Russia (Table 39).

As you can see, Belarusian fear of war prevails over geopolitical priorities: in the answers to the question of Table 38 only about a quarter of respondents refused to make a choice in favor of either the EU or Russia, but in the answers to this question over a half of respondents don't support military preparations of both sides. However, among those who do support these preparations, the share of supporters of Russia is 2.5 times as high as the share of those approve of NATO's actions.

In the answer to the question of Table 38 the share of Eurasian choice supporters exceeds the share of European choice supporters only by a quarter, while

Table 39 demonstrates more than 2-fold predominance.

Or it is possible that a war situation, even a hypothetical one, formulated in a question of a sociological

Table 39

Distribution of answers to the question: "Recently, there was an arms buildup around Belarus: Russia creates new divisions in the West region, and NATO locates their battalions in Poland and Baltic states. Some people in Belarus support Russia's actions, others support NATO and the West. What is your position about it?"

Variant of answer	%
I support Russia's actions: it would protect us from the possible NATO aggression	26.1
I support actions of NATO and the West: it would protect us from the possible Russian aggression	10.6
I support neither side because Belarus could be dragged into an armed conflict	57.6
DA/NA	5.7

Table 40

Distribution of answers to the question: "And if such a conflict happened, which side would you support?"

Variant of answer	%
Russia	33.6
The West	13.4
I would try not to support either side	43.5
DA/NA	9.5

Table 41

Relationship between the attitude to military preparations of NATO and Russia, and the hypothetical conflict between them, and age, and geopolitical priorities*, %

Characteristics	Recently, there was an arms buildup around Belarus: Russia creates new divisions in the West region, and NATO locates their battalions in Poland and Baltic states. Some people in Belarus support Russia's actions, others support NATO and the West. What is your position about it?			And if such a conflict happened, which side would you support?		
	Support Russia	Support NATO/The West	Neither side	Russia	The West	Neither side
Age:						
18-29	17.1	13.7	62.9	22.0	18.0	50.3
30-59	24.1	11.2	59.2	32.6	14.2	43.6
60 +	39.4	6.3	48.6	47.1	7.1	36.3
<i>If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, what choice would you make?</i>						
Integration with the RF	47.0	4.6	44.3	62.7	4.3	28.0
Joining the EU	6.2	22.6	65.4	7.0	30.9	51.8
DA/NA	17.4	4.4	70.0	20.4	4.4	58.8

* The table is read across

The question of Table 40 is formulated even more sharply: "what if there is a war tomorrow?"

It is interesting that the share of those who, in case of a hypothetical conflict, would prefer to take one of the sides is larger than the share of those who don't give priority to either of the sides in the current escalation of tension.

Hypothetically it was possible to suppose that the ratio would be inverse: it is easier to support one of the sides when there is only a war of threats and not a real war. Taking one of the sides in a real confrontation doesn't mean the necessity to fight and die for this side, but doesn't exclude it either. It is possible that Belarusians remember from their tragic history that it would hardly be possible to sit the war out. Therefore, they demonstrate less desire to do it than expected.

questionnaire, intensifies the deep "friend-or-foe" set-ups: while powerful neighbors try to scare one another, it is possible to regret the superfluous bravado and intrepidity of both sides. But when it comes to a real bloodletting, it is necessary to choose who is friend and who is foe.

This mechanism is not universal: 43.5% of respondents who prefer to stay on the sidelines is a relative majority. However, this mechanism explains, why their number is less than the number of those who don't see friends or foes in the current escalation of tension.

As for the ratio of those who chose one of the sides, it is almost the same as in Table 39: the number of those who would support Russia is 2.5 times as high as those who would support the West.

Table 41 demonstrates how the answers to the questions of Tables 39 and 40 correlate with age and geopolitical preferences.

As you can see, young people are more inclined to stay outside of the conflict and take neither side in the current confrontation. There is a strict linear dependency: the older respondents are, the more they are involved (on the side of Russia).

Friends and foes of Belarus

The results of June ISEPS survey demonstrate which countries respondents consider friendly, and which hostile (Table 42). These results confirm a high level of stability of Belarusians' "picture of the world", however the observed changes are quite instructive.

Table 42

Dynamics of answering the question: "Name 5 countries that are the friendliest and 5 that are the most hostile towards Belarus"

Country	Index* (04'06)	Index (12'07)	Index (03'11)	Friendly, %	Hostile, %	Index (06'16)	Index *** Russia (05'16)
Belarus	—**	—	—	—	—	—	0.5
Russia	0.837	0.645	0.308	61.6	8.7	0.529	—
China	0.420	0.543	0.454	48.7	4.6	0.441	0.34
Kazakhstan	0.209	0.261	0.358	41.1	4.2	0.369	0.39
Venezuela	—	0.352	0.673	39.6	4.2	0.354	0.06
Azerbaijan	0.022	−0.012	0.162	16.3	4.1	0.122	0.05
Italy	0.046	0.031	0.019	16.3	4.9	0.114	0.02
Turkmenistan	0.023	−0.011	−0.014	14.3	3.5	0.108	0.02
Ukraine	0.114	0.452	0.194	15.7	10.1	0.056	−0.46
Armenia	0.034	−0.023	0.027	9.2	3.9	0.053	0.13
Poland	−0.034	−0.056	−0.173	16.6	11.4	0.052	−0.23
Bulgaria	0.088	0.033	0.055	9.0	4.2	0.048	0.03
Cuba	0.179	0.209	0.097	8.9	4.6	0.043	0.10
Kyrgyzstan	0.047	−0.027	0.013	7.2	3.8	0.034	0.07
Uzbekistan	0.025	0.009	−0.004	5.5	2.4	0.031	0.09
Moldova	0.047	0.052	0.013	6.4	4.1	0.023	0
Israel	0.028	−0.064	−0.057	9.0	7.0	0.002	0.01
Georgia	−0.196	−0.183	−0.052	7.6	5.8	0.018	−0.08
Romania	0.004	−0.029	−0.017	4.8	3.7	0.011	−0.02
Czechia	−0.016	−0.021	−0.079	4.6	4.0	0.006	0.02
Serbia	−0.024	0.004	−0.017	3.1	3.7	−0.006	0.06
Japan	0.063	−0.024	−0.014	3.6	4.2	−0.006	0
Sweden	−0.028	−0.023	−0.001	4.3	5.0	−0.007	−0.01
Slovakia	−0.013	−0.033	−0.031	3.3	4.2	−0.009	0.01
Latvia	−0.142	−0.127	−0.100	6.0	8.8	−0.028	−0.23
Estonia	−0.112	−0.164	−0.087	1.5	6.0	−0.045	−0.16
Lithuania	−0.089	−0.114	−0.037	10.6	15.6	−0.050	−0.23
Northern Korea	0.037	−0.035	−0.003	2.0	8.8	−0.068	0.03
France	−0.086	−0.075	−0.061	2.7	9.7	−0.070	0.01
Turkey	0	−0.013	−0.003	3.5	10.5	−0.070	−0.28
Iran	0.035	0.038	−0.081	4.2	11.5	−0.073	0
UK	−0.190	−0.177	−0.076	5.6	16.4	−0.108	−0.17
Germany	0.016	0.014	−0.037	8.9	23.7	−0.148	−0.17
USA	−0.702	−0.606	−0.56	4.2	52.4	−0.482	−0.71

* Index is the difference between the friendly and hostile estimations divided by 100

** The dash means that this country was not present in the list

*** According to "Levada-Center" (see <http://www.levada.ru/2016/06/02/13400/>)

As for geopolitical orientations, Table 40 visually demonstrates that supporters of integration with Russia are more inclined to support Russia both in the current confrontation and in the hypothetical war, than the supporters of European integration – to take the side of the West.

Almost in all 4 surveys Russia is the best friend of Belarus. The only exception was the survey of March 2011, soon after the "gas war" and "godfathers" of 2010, at the peak of an acute economic crisis, when Russia didn't hurry to come to the rescue of the ally. Instead, at the time, the political and economic "romance" between Belarus and Venezuela was at its

height. And that was the only time when Russia did not head the list of friends.

In all other surveys Russia always took the first spot, just like it happened now. However, even excluding the fluctuation of 2011, it's not difficult to see that the level of friendly evaluations slowly decreases.

The role of the main enemy is constantly played by the US. However, an opposite trend can be observed in the relation to the US. Even though evaluations of the US are the most negative, with time they become less so.

Often you can hear that Belarusians' opinion on foreign policy is formed mainly by Russian mass media, that Belarusians, so to speak, see the world through the Russian eyes.

It is partially so. Belarus and Russia are the closest friends for each other. Two other close friends are China (second position after Russia in Belarus) and Kazakhstan (second position after Belarus in Russia).

The main enemy is the same for both countries as well. But the rest of the list is different. The second most important enemy for Belarusians is Germany, while for Russians it's Ukraine. Belarusians still see Ukraine as a friend, although the rating is not very high.

The fourth most important enemy of Russia is Poland. Again, Belarusians rather regard Poland as a friend, even though it was considered to be an enemy in all past surveys.

enced the improvement of attitude to these countries; financial aid of Azerbaijan to Belarus in 2010, and the recent visit of Azerbaijan leader I. Aliiev could have brought this country to the top five of friends. Nothing like this happens in Russia. And the most outstanding example – Venezuela. Russians have almost no attitude to it, but Belarusians remember their friendship and support – or what was told about it.

Naturally, there are also similarities between the "pictures of the world" of two nations. Countries of the Western Europe seem more or less hostile to both Belarusians and Russians, and their friends are mostly the CIS countries and China.

But the dynamics of indices demonstrate that the situation in Belarus 10 years ago was quite similar. Russians saw the world differently back then: Germany and France seemed rather friendly to them, and the attitude to the US was rather positive.

It is not Russians who taught Belarusians "the science of hate", it's more like Russians moved closer to the Belarusian vision of the world with an obvious overkill, while Belarusians in general remained as they were. Russian propaganda did not make them more "western-phobic". The attitude to the US remains negative but is better than it was; the attitude to Poland and Italy became rather and very positive accordingly; the attitude to Ukraine became worse, but they still remain friends.

Table 43

Distribution of answers to the question: "After a diplomatic conflict between Belarus and the USA, which broke out in the spring of 2008, the relationship between the two countries remains tense (the staff of the US embassy in Minsk was reduced by the factor of 5, and Belarusians have to go to other countries to obtain the US visa). Do you think it is important or not to restore normal relations with the US?"

Variant of answer	%
It is important to restore normal relations with the US	32.9
It is not important	23.5
I don't care	34.6
DA/NA	9.0

Analysis of Levada-Center results, mentioned here, demonstrates that Russians' attitude is much more contrasting. If Russians consider some country as friendly, then there are almost no respondents who consider this country hostile (less than 1%). This is particularly true in relation to Belarus.

And vice versa, there are almost no respondents who consider Russia's enemies as friendly countries. Belarusians' attitude is more nuanced. Overwhelming majority of Belarusians consider Russia to be a friend, but 9% share the opposite opinion. 4% of respondents believe that the US is a friend for Belarus (compare with 1% in Russia). And the "levels of hostility" (the shares of respondents consider a country as an enemy) are lower in Belarus. In particular, negative attitude to the US is 20 points lower in Belarus than in Russia.

Some of peculiarities of Belarusians' attitude should be noted as well. These peculiarities are probably defined by the recent events: A. Lukashenko's visit to Italy, and visit of the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland W. Waszczykowski to Minsk could have influ-

In other words, the theory of "Russian eyes" through which Belarusians supposedly look at the world doesn't seem completely adequate. There is Belarusian propaganda as well, and it puts different accents; there is national character; there is a different level on involvement into the Ukrainian conflict, for example. All these factors hold out Belarusian attitude from becoming an exact copy of Russian one.

In fine we propose to your attention the results of Table 43. These results testify that anti-Americanism of Belarusians, so prominent in Table 42, is not very strong in reality.

As you can see, there is no general desire to restore normal relations with the US, but there is an evident superiority of supporters of this opinion.

"I went off to fight with a gun and a pack..."

In April 2016 the Parliament adopted amendments to the penal code, providing a juridical base for criminal prosecution of Belarusians participating in battle ac-

tions in Ukraine on both sides of the front. In May these amendments came into force. There were attempts to hold these people accountable before, their families were under pressure, but the penal code included only an article on mercenaries. This article was difficult to prove, and not all people who participated in the war in Ukraine were mercenaries. Since May 2016 the very fact of participating in battle actions outside of Belarus without a special sanction of the state became criminal regardless of the motives.

It's also worth a reminder, that in May T. Avatarov, a citizen of the Republic of Belarus and a volunteer fighter for "The Right Sector", was confined to 5 years of imprisonment.

In September 2014 IISEPS asked a question on the respondents' attitude to the participation of Belarusian citizens in the war in Ukraine. In June 2016 we asked this question again (Table 44).

Ukraine were a matter of future. Now the price of this war is known to everyone, including Belarusians. Moreover, the actions in question asked in 2016 are now considered criminal according to the Belarusian law. Belarusian motto "let there be no war" hardly lost its popularity over this time as well. And still...

Table 45 results demonstrate how the attitude to the participation of Belarusians in the war in Ukraine is connected to the age, the attitude to the President, and the geopolitical choice.

"I went off to fight with a gun and a pack, so the poor in Granada could get the land back" – young people are more inclined to follow the motive formulated in the poem of M. Svetlov (translated by M. Wettlin), regardless of who are those "poor" who need help of Belarusian fighters to "get the land back". The share of those who sympathize with Belarusians fighting on the side of Ukraine is higher among young people, but the

Table 44

Dynamics of answering the question: "According to official information hundreds of Belarusian citizens participate in the battle actions in the East of Ukraine: some on the side of the Ukrainian army, others on the side of armed protesters. Belarusian powers express negative attitude towards it. Thus, a Belarusian fighter of The Right Sector has recently been confined to 5 years of imprisonment. What is your attitude to the participation of Belarusian citizens in the battle actions in Ukraine?", %

Variant of answer	09'14*	06'16
Positive, if they are on the side of Ukrainian army	6.0	10.8
Positive, if they are on the side of participants of armed protests	8.3	10.6
Negative	76.9	70.9
DA/NA	8.8	7.7

* In September 2014 the question was formulated as follows: "What is your attitude to the participation of Belarusian citizens in combat actions in the East of Ukraine?"

Table 45

Relationship between the attitude towards participation of Belarusians in the war in Ukraine, trust to the President, and the preferred vector of integration*, %

Characteristics	What is your attitude to the participation of Belarusian citizens in combat actions in Ukraine?			
	Positive, if they are on the side of Ukrainian army	Positive, if they are on the side of participants of armed protests	Negative	DA/NA
<i>Age:</i>				
18-29	15.7	12.9	63.1	8.3
30-59	10.1	9.2	72.8	7.6
60 +	7.4	11.7	74.6	6.0
<i>Do you trust the President?</i>				
Trust	9.1	12.8	68.7	9.2
Don't trust	14.1	9.8	70.8	5.2
<i>If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the EU, what would you choose?</i>				
Integration with Russia	6.3	11.7	75.0	6.9
Joining the EU	19.6	10.3	64.2	5.6
DA/NA	6.1	9.4	73.6	10.7

* The table is read across

The increase is small but noticeable. At the same time the share of supporters of battle actions' participants on any side became almost equal.

This result is quite unexpected. In September 2014 the bloodiest pages of the confrontation in the East of

share of those sharing the opposite sympathy is high enough – higher than average. As for old and wise people, most of them would prefer that Belarusians don't participate in battling actions at all.

Apparently, this age difference determines the difference between people with opposite political views as well: President's supporters and adherent of integration with Russia are less inclined to support Belarusians' participation in battle actions in Donbass. Geopolitical priorities turn out to be a more differentiating factor than attitude to A. Lukashenko.

Geopolitical choice also differentiates the shares of those who support Belarusians on the side of Kiev and on the side of DNR/LNR: the share of former is twice as low among "Belo-Russians" as the share of latter; among "Euro-Belarusians" the ratio is the opposite. Among those who trust or don't trust the President the difference between these shares is less contrasting.

What Belarusians think of America

June IISEPS survey demonstrated that, as previously, Belarusians consider the US as the most hostile country to Belarus – 52.4% of respondents share this opinion (only 4.2% of respondents believe that the US is a friendly country). For comparison, the next country in the list of hostility is Germany with 23.7% of votes.

In other words, does this mean that Belarusians are an anti-American nation? Some would say that Belarusians are victims of domestic and Russian propaganda, others that Belarusians are a nation that is immanently alien to the world leader culturally and ideo

Table 46

Distribution of answers to the question: "What is your attitude to the United States of America and their impact on the world and Belarus?", %

Variant of answer	Very positive	Rather positive	Rather negative	Very negative	Index*
The US in general	14.6	41.1	27.1	8.2	0.204
Americans	16.5	44.1	23.1	5.1	0.324
Propagation of American ideas in Belarus	9.0	26.3	34.0	13.6	-0.123
American perception of democracy	8.2	28.3	31.0	12.0	-0.065
American business experience	19.3	32.6	17.1	6.5	0.283
American music, cinema, TV	24.7	39.3	17.6	8.4	0.380
American science and technology	24.8	46.4	13.1	5.2	0.520

* Index is the difference between the shares of positive and negative evaluations

Table 47

Indices of attitude to the United States of America and their impact on the world and on a specific country*

Variant of answer	Brazil	Mexico	Venezuela	Nigeria	The SAR
The US in general	0.496	0.373	0.155	0.555	0.521
Americans	0.435	0.245	0.155	0.553	0.395
Propagation of American ideas in your country	0.107	-0.104	-0.236	0.294	0.312
American perception of democracy	0.272	0.039	-0.074	0.602	0.452
American business experience	0.242	0.126	-0.003	0.588	0.497
American music, cinema, TV	0.438	0.282	0.311	0.346	0.557
American science and technology	0.654	0.368	0.427	0.802	0.618

* Results of Pew survey conducted in 2013

In general, it should be stated that overwhelming majority of Belarusians doesn't support their compatriots' participation in the war in Ukraine. This trend is observed in all demographic groups regardless of their political preferences.

At the same time even political preferences impact differently the attitude to Belarusians watching one another in Donbass through optical sights: among Lukashenko's supporters and adherents of integration with Russia there are enough people who sympathize Belarusians fighting in Ukraine against separatists; among people who don't trust the President and prefer joining the EU, almost each tenth sympathizes with compatriots fighting against Ukraine.

logically.

Not at all! Yes, there is a general ascertaining of hostility – either to Belarus or to the official Minsk. But in the answers to the question on different aspects of attitude towards the US and its impact, the evaluations are not strictly negative, on the opposite, they are rather positive (Table 46).

More than a half of respondents feel positive about the US and the Americans as a nation. Belarusians are even more positive towards American culture, music, cinema, science and technology.

How is Belarusian attitude compared to the attitude to the US in other countries of the world? Belarusian researchers often content themselves with quite a narrow region – Europe and the CIS countries. Meanwhile the world is big and diverse. And comparing your coun-

try to faraway exotic countries may help to better understand yourself and your place in the world.

American Pew Research Center asked the same question in surveys conducted in Latin America and Africa in 2013 (later researches are not yet published). However, it is instructive to compare these results with the Belarusian results of June 2016 (Table 47).

The high level of positive evaluations of "Americana" in two African giants, Nigeria and the SAR, attracts attention. However, in the comparison between Belarus and Latin American countries, including the political opponent of the US Venezuela, Belarus doesn't look like a stronghold of anti-Americanism. Opinions on Americans are close to the level of Mexico, a little higher than in Venezuela. Opinions on the American style of conducting business is also close to the US neighbor Mexico. Evaluations of American culture are close to pro-American Brazil and Nigeria, as well as the evaluations of American technologies.

Racist arrogance is not pertinent here: Nigeria is a country with population of 194 billion people, larger than Russia; the SAR is a large country as well, 48 billion people, one of the most quickly developing countries of the world.

Comparison with the results of a Pew Survey conducted in 2012 is even more instructive (Table 48).

to that are leading in Europe, so they evaluate American business style quite negatively.

Russians still remember the times when they "constructed rockets" and played on equal terms with the US in some technological spheres, hence they evaluate negatively American achievements in technology and science. Belarusians don't aspire to compete with the US in this field, and they give credit to the US for their business, culture and technology. As for the lack of enthusiasm about propagation of American ideas in Belarus and American perceptions of democracy, well, who shows great enthusiasm about this?

As strange as it may seem, countries, situated very far from Belarus and much more powerful in various aspects, do. For example, China, geopolitical rival of the US, India, Nigeria, the SAR. But if you compare with European neighbors, Belarus doesn't look strange. Even Poland, a very pro-American country, doesn't welcome propagation of American ideas. And when compared to Germany, the most influential ally of the US in Europe, it turns out that Belarusians are even more positive about the impact of American ideas than Germans.

The fact that the US is not very appreciated in many countries can have different explanations. America bears the burden of ruling the world, and stranger's

Table 48

Indices of attitude to the United States of America and their impact on the world and on a specific country*

Variant of answer	China	Egypt	Germany	India	Poland	Russia	Turkey
The US in general	-0.064	-0.596	0.074	0.345	0.450	0.182	-0.565
Americans	-0.134	-0.307	0.336	0.320	0.525	0.397	-0.564
Propagation of American ideas in your country	0.076	-0.711	-0.487	-0.098	-0.174	-0.477	-0.674
American perception of democracy	0.191	-0.119	-0.004	0.009	0.066	-0.256	-0.584
American business experience	0.102	0.095	-0.401	0.099	0.054	-0.073	-0.595
American music, cinema, TV	-0.004	-0.236	0.339	-0.296	0.442	0.072	-0.262
American science and technology	0.569	0.481	0.192	0.410	0.473	-0.147	-0.004

* Results of Pew survey conducted in 2012

The broader geography of survey 2012 demonstrates even more convincingly that Belarusian anti-Americanism is very relative. Turkey is a formal military ally of the US, Egypt is not a formal ally, but still cooperates with the US closely, Cairo receives billions of dollars from Washington, D.C. Still, Belarusians in comparison with Egypt and Turkey are exemplary pro-American. Anti-American moods in Egypt and Turkey go through the roof: negative evaluations are registered not only for the official politics of Washington, D.C., but also for almost every other manifestation of "Americana".

Compared to these countries, Belarus, which has no military or political alliance with the US, demonstrates a much more sympathetic attitude. An interesting point of Table 48 are deviations from the trend. Basically, all countries, even those that don't like the US in general, quite highly appreciate American style of doing business and American technologies. But Germans know how to conduct business too, and thanks

rule is usually not pleasing.

It seems that a hypothetical Pax China or Pax Russia would have attracted much higher irritation. But it should be noted that despite the ascertaining of Washington's hostility towards the official Minsk, there is no deep anti-Americanism in Belarus. Probably, there is no deep love as well. But there is a respect to the great nation, living over the ocean, there are positive opinions on their ability to conduct business and discover technological innovations. This positive attitude is obvious in comparison with other countries of the world.

Belarusians are not Egyptians or Turks who express mass dislike to everything American. Belarusians are not Russians as well. We have no Pew data from 2014 and subsequent years on Russians' attitude to America and various aspects of American culture, but a range of other researches testifies on a drastic worsening of Russians' attitude to America. If something like this happens in Belarus, it is not significant.

Attitude towards the US and Americans is quite positive. We can suppose that it can become even better in case of political changes in Belarus. Although it's unlikely that it will change fundamentally. Results of the Pew survey for 2012 regarding Poland and Germany demonstrate that even the most pro-American countries of Europe do not consider themselves as the 51st state of the US. In this regard Belarus is a normal European country with a certain scepticism about American influence and with a fair share of sympathy to the New World. This sympathy is not overcome by neither domestic nor Russian propaganda.

Clinton-Trump: Belarusian choice

Belarusians are not very interested in the US elections, as opposed to 2008. Not many of them are ready to formulate their preferences (Table 49). Nevertheless, in their eyes Donald Trump has a small but significant advantage over Hillary Clinton.

In June IISEPS survey we asked a question on who the respondents would vote for if they participated in the US presidential elections this year. During the period the survey was conducted Bernie Sanders still continued the struggle in the primaries, but it was clear who would be the candidates of the two leading US parties.

The conclusion about the lack of interest to US elections this year is based on comparison of Table 49 results with the results of March 2008 survey, conducted in the height of primaries. Back then 26.1% of respondents expresses sympathy towards Hillary Clinton, 15.5% – John McCain, 11.7% – Barack Obama.

However, sympathy does not equal readiness to vote, even if a hypothetical one. Still, comparison of results is possible.

Certain political analysts compare Trump's success during the primaries with A. Lukashenko's rise to power in 1994.

Table 49 results confirm this comparison partly: in

Table 49

Distribution of answers to the question: "If you voted on presidential elections in the US this year, who would you vote for?"

Variant of answer	%
For the former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton	14.4
For the multi-millionaire Donald Trump	15.8
For another candidate	8.2
For no one	45.6
DA/NA	16.0

Table 50

Relationship between the hypothetic vote on the US elections and socio-demographic characteristics and political preferences*, %

Characteristics	If you voted on presidential elections in the US this year, who would you vote for?	
	For Hillary Clinton	For Donald Trump
<i>Gender:</i>		
Male	9.5	24.3
Female	18.5	8.7
<i>Age:</i>		
18-29	18.1	21.8
30-59	14.2	15.8
60 +	11.4	10.0
<i>Education:</i>		
Primary	10.5	7.4
Incomplete secondary	11.0	6.5
Secondary	13.4	17.6
Vocational	17.3	18.1
Higher	15.3	16.9
<i>Do you trust the President?</i>		
Trust	10.6	12.2
Don't trust	17.4	20.1
<i>If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the EU, what would you choose?</i>		
Integration with Russia	8.3	13.9
Joining the EU	21.8	22.2

* The table is read across

2008 Clinton was the most popular candidate among Belarusians, but now she is second to her Republican rival according to Belarusian "vote" (Table 50). How do American electoral preferences of Belarusians depend on socio-demographic characteristics and political preferences?

Apparently, under otherwise equal conditions, women in any country are more inclined to prefer their sister, so to say. Belarusian women prefer Clinton, while men prefer Trump. It should be noted that Belarusian men are noticeably more interested in the US elections.

It is curious that young people prefer the Republican candidate, while elderly people would rather choose Clinton. Possibly, this is because Clinton is the wife of the familiar former President and not a new person in politics. Elderly people prefer familiar things to innovations.

Possibly, the same mechanism determines the correlation between choice and education. In the US average Trump voter has a lower level of education than an average Clinton voter. In Belarus it's the contrary. Respondents with primary and incomplete secondary education prefer the Democratic candidate.

For people like them in the US Trump is a symbol of social revenge to establishment. For Belarusians with

low education American elections are a kind of another planet. Clinton is better known, at least as a wife of the ex-President. Such people prefer less changes, even if these changes happen in the US. Changes are always for the worse according to them.

Attitude to the President of Belarus doesn't really influence the choice of the future President of the USA. A. Lukashenko's supporters are less interested in American elections than those who don't trust him. The order of sympathies is basically the same: Trump is more popular. Let him make his America great again.

Geopolitical preferences influence the hypothetical political choice in the US much more. Clinton's "rating" is at its low among the supporters of integration with Russia. Possibly, this is due to the careful but evident preference to Trump expressed in Russian mass media. Although, Trump's rating is not that high in this group as well, just as the interest to the US election in general.

To play this game on the request of sociologists one needs to imagine themselves in the place of Americans. Supporters of integration of Belarus and Russia aren't very inclined to that.

As for "Euro-Belarusians", virtually there is a parity between supporter of Clinton and Trump.

Some results of the opinion poll conducted in June, 2016 (%)

1. "If you agree that Belarusian economy is in crisis, then what are its main reasons?"

Table 1.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
The reasons are external	27.8	15.7	25.7	20.4	22.6	22.0	28.0	42.1
The reasons are internal	45.7	51.0	45.3	55.1	54.4	54.6	48.5	25.2
DA/NA	26.5	33.3	29.0	24.5	23.0	23.4	213.5	32.7

Table 1.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
The reasons are external	63.2	32.5	27.9	23.0	20.7
The reasons are internal	17.8	26.0	44.6	53.6	55.6
DA/NA	19.0	31.5	27.5	23.4	23.7

Table 1.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
The reasons are external	18.5	27.2	19.6	42.1	21.1
The reasons are internal	54.9	50.1	47.1	26.5	58.9
DA/NA	26.6	22.7	33.3	31.4	20.0

Table 1.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
The reasons are external	16.6	28.3	27.4	21.6	35.0	36.9	33.3
The reasons are internal	56.3	42.9	45.2	45.6	43.0	38.6	42.5
DA/NA	27.1	28.8	27.4	32.8	22.0	24.5	24.2

Table 1.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
The reasons are external	22.4	40.1	25.9	28.0	28.4
The reasons are internal	56.3	39.4	43.6	42.8	45.5
DA/NA	27.1	20.5	30.5	29.2	26.1

2. "What is your attitude to President Lukashenko's statement that "absolute majority of our citizens are concordant with the retirement age increase"?"

Table 2.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
I agree	15.1	13.7	6.6	11.6	12.1	8.5	13.6	29.1
I disagree	58.8	47.1	54.6	62.6	65.9	72.1	69.3	37.0
I don't care	17.7	35.3	26.3	17.0	12.5	11.7	11.7	25.1
DA/NA	8.4	3.9	12.5	8.8	9.5	7.7	5.4	8.8

Table 2.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
I agree	41.1	28.4	11.0	11.4	12.9
I disagree	30.5	40.0	60.4	64.7	66.7
I don't care	28.4	20.0	20.7	14.9	11.9
DA/NA	0	11.6	7.9	9.0	8.5

Table 2.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
I agree	12.5	9.6	9.7	27.9	10.0
I disagree	64.1	70.5	48.5	38.1	70.0
I don't care	14.9	13.1	31.1	24.8	11.1
DA/NA	8.4	6.8	10.7	9.2	8.9

Table 2.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
I agree	7.5	11.1	15.1	18.8	13.9	14.3	27.9
I disagree	67.3	65.5	64.2	52.9	43.3	65.1	49.3
I don't care	20.1	18.6	13.8	24.1	17.9	12.0	16.6
DA/NA	5.1	4.9	6.9	4.1	24.9	8.6	6.1

Table 2.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
I agree	7.5	18.4	11.1	22.2	16.5
I disagree	67.3	58.0	58.6	53.7	56.8
I don't care	20.1	14.0	21.3	16.3	17.1
DA/NA	5.1	9.6	9.0	7.8	9.6

3. "Recently President Alexander Lukashenko said that "Amid the current troubled situation Belarus is rightly considered as a nook of stability". But many people think that "Belarusian stability is closer to stagnation, and there is no development in the country". What do you think about it?"

Table 3.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
I agree that "amid the current troubled situation Belarus is rightly considered as a nook of stability"	33.4	27.5	21.6	27.2	25.3	25.2	28.8	57.8
I agree that "our stability is closer to stagnation, and there is no development in the country"	53.5	60.8	68.0	53.1	60.0	62.1	55.7	32.8
DA/NA	13.1	11.7	10.4	19.7	14.7	12.7	15.5	9.4

Table 3.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
I agree that "amid the current troubled situation Belarus is rightly considered as a nook of stability"	72.6	54.5	30.6	26.3	25.1
I agree that "our stability is closer to stagnation, and there is no development in the country"	21.1	35.1	55.5	60.7	59.7
DA/NA	6.3	10.4	13.9	13.0	15.2

Table 3.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
I agree that "amid the current troubled situation Belarus is rightly considered as a nook of stability"	243.4	27.4	25.7	54.8	23.1
I agree that "our stability is closer to stagnation, and there is no development in the country"	60.7	60.6	63.4	34.4	51.6
DA/NA	14.9	12.0	10.9	10.8	25.3

Table 3.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
I agree that "amid the current troubled situation Belarus is rightly considered as a nook of stability"	27.9	33.9	31.7	35.3	40.0	39.8	29.4
I agree that "our stability is closer to stagnation, and there is no development in the country"	50.3	52.9	59.6	48.8	55.5	44.9	60.5
DA/NA	21.8	13.2	8.7	15.9	4.5	15.3	10.1

Table 3.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
I agree that "amid the current troubled situation Belarus is rightly considered as a nook of stability"	27.9	31.5	34.4	38.0	35.1
I agree that "our stability is closer to stagnation, and there is no development in the country"	50.3	56.5	53.5	51.6	54.9
DA/NA	21.8	12.0	12.1	10.4	10.0

4. "Which of the following statements on Belarusian state, built under the rule of A. Lukashenko, do you agree with?"

Table 4.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
It is my state, it protects my interests	29.5	24.0	22.4	21.8	17.4	21.2	27.9	54.0
It is only partially my state, it doesn't protect my interests enough	47.1	40.0	48.7	48.3	61.0	52.7	50.6	29.4
It is not my state, it does not protect my interests and I do not trust it	15.2	22.0	22.4	17.7	14.0	19.1	13.2	9.1
DA/NA	8.2	14.0	6.5	12.2	7.6	7.0	8.3	7.5

Table 4.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
It is my state, it protects my interests	69.8	49.7	26.2	22.1	22.0
It is only partially my state, it doesn't protect my interests enough	22.9	34.2	50.2	52.0	49.0
It is not my state, it does not protect my interests and I do not trust it	4.2	7.7	15.6	17.1	19.3
DA/NA	3.1	8.4	8.0	8.8	9.7

Table 4.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
It is my state, it protects my interests	19.3	24.7	21.8	50.4	20.9
It is only partially my state, it doesn't protect my interests enough	51.3	53.2	51.5	33.2	49.5
It is not my state, it does not protect my interests and I do not trust it	19.1	14.6	18.8	9.2	23.1
DA/NA	10.3	7.5	7.9	7.2	6.5

Table 4.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
It is my state, it protects my interests	28.0	34.1	28.0	35.5	31.0	28.4	23.1
It is only partially my state, it doesn't protect my interests enough	49.5	48.7	49.1	39.6	53.0	43.8	43.7
It is not my state, it does not protect my interests and I do not trust it	15.0	13.2	11.9	15.4	11.0	17.0	22.3
DA/NA	7.5	4.0	11.0	9.5	5.0	10.8	10.9

Table 4.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
It is my state, it protects my interests	28.0	26.3	28.1	36.2	29.4
It is only partially my state, it doesn't protect my interests enough	49.5	49.1	49.5	39.7	47.2
It is not my state, it does not protect my interests and I do not trust it	15.0	12.6	19.6	18.3	11.9
DA/NA	7.5	14.0	2.8	18.8	11.5

5. "According to you, is the fact that now almost all of the state power is concentrated in the hands of A. Lukashenko, favorable for Belarus or there is nothing good for the country in it?"

Table 5.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
It's favorable for Belarus	31.3	60.0	66.0	59.2	22.3	21.6	32.2	56.1
There is nothing good for the country in it	55.5	14.0	11.8	20.4	66.0	64.7	56.1	32.8
DA/NA	13.2	14.0	13.2	22.4	11.7	13.7	11.7	11.1

Table 5.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
It's favorable for Belarus	68.4	55.5	28.0	23.7	23.7
There is nothing good for the country in it	29.5	29.7	57.7	61.8	64.1
DA/NA	2.1	14.8	14.3	14.5	12.2

Table 5.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
It's favorable for Belarus	21.5	24.8	20.8	54.3	24.2
There is nothing good for the country in it	64.3	61.9	65.3	33.9	61.5
DA/NA	14.2	13.3	13.9	11.8	14.3

Table 5.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
It's favorable for Belarus	24.8	27.3	27.5	47.6	28.0	38.3	32.5
There is nothing good for the country in it	66.0	61.2	63.8	42.4	53.0	33.7	57.0
DA/NA	9.2	11.5	8.7	10.0	19.0	28.0	10.5

Table 5.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
It's favorable for Belarus	24.8	26.6	33.0	34.2	36.4
There is nothing good for the country in it	66.0	55.6	56.0	52.9	48.6
DA/NA	9.2	17.8	11.0	12.9	15.0

6. "According to you, which of the opinions better describes the degree of social tension in Belarusian society?"

Table 6.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
There are no social tensions and conflicts in Belarusian society	26.3	20.4	26.1	16.3	19.2	20.6	21.2	45.4
Social tension is present in Belarusian society, but it's less important than in Russia and other countries of the CIS	42.2	42.9	39.9	48.3	46.4	40.8	46.6	35.1
Social tension is quite high in Belarusian society, and it tends to grow further	27.2	32.7	29.4	34.0	30.9	34.8	27.3	13.7
DA	4.3	4.0	4.6	1.4	3.5	3.8	4.9	5.8

Table 6.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
There are no social tensions and conflicts in Belarusian society	63.5	40.6	24.7	19.9	19.0
Social tension is present in Belarusian society, but it's less important than in Russia and other countries of the CIS	25.0	37.4	45.1	43.8	42.4
Social tension is quite high in Belarusian society, and it tends to grow further	9.4	12.9	26.6	32.0	34.9
DA	2.1	9.1	3.6	4.3	3.7

Table 6.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
There are no social tensions and conflicts in Belarusian society	19.6	21.0	22.5	41.8	24.2
Social tension is present in Belarusian society, but it's less important than in Russia and other countries of the CIS	41.8	44.4	45.1	38.0	46.2
Social tension is quite high in Belarusian society, and it tends to grow further	33.5	32.2	28.5	14.5	23.1
DA	5.1	2.4	3.9	5.7	6.5

Table 6.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
There are no social tensions and conflicts in Belarusian society	28.0	32.7	24.0	29.8	18.0	18.3	31.0
Social tension is present in Belarusian society, but it's less important than in Russia and other countries of the CIS	38.2	35.4	37.3	39.8	47.0	60.0	42.8
Social tension is quite high in Belarusian society, and it tends to grow further	29.0	29.2	35.0	26.3	31.5	17.1	19.7
DA	4.8	2.7	3.7	4.1	3.5	4.6	6.5

Table 6.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
There are no social tensions and conflicts in Belarusian society	28.0	21.8	24.1	25.7	30.5
Social tension is present in Belarusian society, but it's less important than in Russia and other countries of the CIS	38.2	49.5	45.4	38.5	40.1
Social tension is quite high in Belarusian society, and it tends to grow further	29.0	24.9	26.6	30.7	25.3
DA	4.8	3.8	3.9	5.1	4.1

7. "What would you do with the political forces, whose activities are not contrary to the law, but, according to your opinion, are detrimental to the interests of Belarus?"

Table 7.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Ban their activities	28.8	26.0	28.3	21.9	19.6	19.9	28.3	47.1
Restrict opportunities to popularize their ideas and convictions on radio, TV and in newspapers	21.0	16.0	13.2	21.9	22.6	23.8	21.5	20.9
Restrict opportunities to organize public actions (meetings, marches, demonstrations)	15.2	18.0	17.8	8.9	16.6	16.0	14.0	15.7
Grant equal rights as compared to other forces	27.5	34.0	33.6	37.0	33.1	32.6	27.9	11.4
DA	7.5	6.0	7.1	10.3	7.9	7.7	8.3	4.9

Table 7.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Ban their activities	57.9	43.9	27.9	20.7	25.2
Restrict opportunities to popularize their ideas and convictions on radio, TV and in newspapers	10.5	27.1	21.1	21.6	20.4
Restrict opportunities to organize public actions (meetings, marches, demonstrations)	17.9	12.3	14.7	17.6	13.3
Grant equal rights as compared to other forces	11.6	8.4	28.6	31.8	34.7
DA	2.1	8.3	7.7	8.3	6.4

Table 7.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Ban their activities	20.5	24.3	23.5	46.4	22.2
Restrict opportunities to popularize their ideas and convictions on radio, TV and in newspapers	23.5	20.8	13.7	20.4	22.2
Restrict opportunities to organize public actions (meetings, marches, demonstrations)	14.7	15.4	18.6	15.6	11.1
Grant equal rights as compared to other forces	31.3	32.8	37.3	12.0	35.6
DA	10.0	6.7	6.9	5.6	8.9

Table 7.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Ban their activities	28.3	27.3	26.3	33.9	27.0	28.6	31.4
Restrict opportunities to popularize their ideas and convictions on radio, TV and in newspapers	6.5	13.2	15.2	18.1	51.5	24.6	26.6
Restrict opportunities to organize public actions (meetings, marches, demonstrations)	7.8	13.2	12.4	18.1	6.5	25.1	26.6
Grant equal rights as compared to other forces	47.5	41.9	37.3	20.5	9.5	16.0	8.3
DA	9.9	4.4	8.8	9.4	5.5	5.7	7.1

Table 7.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Ban their activities	28.3	24.0	27.8	33.5	30.8
Restrict opportunities to popularize their ideas and convictions on radio, TV and in newspapers	6.5	22.9	24.6	27.2	23.8
Restrict opportunities to organize public actions (meetings, marches, demonstrations)	7.8	21.2	15.7	12.8	17.1
Grant equal rights as compared to other forces	47.5	22.6	25.3	20.2	23.1
DA	9.9	9.3	6.8	6.3	5.2

8. "Do you agree with the following statement of President Alexander Lukashenko: "Belarusian electoral law is not worse than in other countries where elections were accepted by the international structures"?"

Table 8.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Agree	51.2	40.0	44.1	40.4	38.5	40.3	53.4	77.1
Disagree	33.8	38.0	35.5	39.0	41.1	45.9	34.1	14.6
DA/NA	15.0	22.0	20.4	20.6	20.4	13.8	12.5	8.3

Table 8.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Agree	84.2	64.3	49.2	45.4	45.8
Disagree	10.5	22.1	33.9	37.5	41.7
DA/NA	5.3	13.7	16.9	17.1	12.5

Table 8.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Agree	37.1	47.5	42.2	74.8	44.0
Disagree	44.4	38.0	37.3	15.8	36.3
DA/NA	18.5	14.5	20.5	9.4	19.7

Table 8.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Agree	38.2	49.8	53.9	71.8	54.5	45.1	53.5
Disagree	37.9	37.9	35.5	23.5	25.0	33.1	38.6
DA/NA	23.9	12.3	10.6	4.7	20.5	21.8	7.9

Table 8.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Agree	38.2	46.9	53.9	59.1	57.2
Disagree	37.9	38.0	33.7	30.4	29.9
DA/NA	23.9	15.1	12.4	10.5	12.9

9. "Do you agree with the following statement of President Alexander Lukashenko: "People's will, according to the hands-on experience, will be expressed in the absolutely democratic atmosphere"?"

Table 9.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Agree	38.4	32.0	33.3	28.6	30.6	28.6	37.4	60.1
Disagree	43.4	44.0	46.4	49.7	55.1	54.4	40.4	23.9
DA/NA	18.2	24.0	20.3	21.7	14.3	17.0	22.2	16.0

Table 9.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Agree	70.8	54.2	38.8	31.1	29.2
Disagree	19.8	27.7	41.4	49.4	54.2
DA/NA	9.4	18.1	19.8	19.5	16.6

Table 9.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Agree	22.2	38.0	36.3	57.7	33.0
Disagree	58.8	46.5	39.2	23.5	47.3
DA/NA	19.0	15.5	24.5	18.8	19.7

Table 9.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Agree	33.0	45.6	41.7	54.4	30.0	39.8	29.3
Disagree	45.9	39.4	42.2	40.4	39.0	36.9	56.3
DA/NA	21.1	15.0	16.1	5.2	31.0	23.3	14.4

Table 9.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Agree	33.0	35.3	41.3	48.6	36.2
Disagree	45.9	46.9	45.2	34.2	43.7
DA/NA	21.1	17.8	13.5	17.2	20.1

10. "Lately there were different opinions on the victory in the Second World War. Thus, Vladimir Putin expressed confidence that "Russia could have won the Great Patriotic War even without the help of Ukraine; the victory became possible at the expense of human and industrial resources of the Russian Federation". Others, including Alexander Lukashenko, believe that "it was the united family of brotherhood republics of the Soviet Union that turned into the mighty power which crashed Nazism". Still others emphasize that "the victory over fascism was achieved due to the combined efforts of the USSR and the Western countries". What do you think?"

Table 10.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
I think that "the victory became possible at the expense of human and industrial resources of the Russian Federation"	7.2	7.8	3.3	4.8	7.2	7.1	6.8	10.3
I think that "it was the united family of brotherhood republics of the Soviet Union that turned into the mighty power which crashed Nazism"	63.8	54.9	60.5	61.6	63.8	63.1	67.4	65.5
I think that "the victory over fascism was achieved due to the combined efforts of the USSR and the Western countries"	25.3	31.4	31.6	30.1	24.5	27.3	22.7	20.8
DA/NA	3.7	5.9	4.6	3.5	4.5	2.5	3.1	3.4

Table 10.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
I think that "the victory became possible at the expense of human and industrial resources of the Russian Federation"	7.4	12.3	7.1	5.7	6.8
I think that "it was the united family of brotherhood republics of the Soviet Union that turned into the mighty power which crashed Nazism"	71.6	65.8	66.1	62.5	58.2
I think that "the victory over fascism was achieved due to the combined efforts of the USSR and the Western countries"	21.0	16.8	23.3	28.3	31.0
DA/NA	0	5.1	3.5	4.5	4.0

Table 10.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
I think that "the victory became possible at the expense of human and industrial resources of the Russian Federation"	7.6	4.8	4.9	9.9	9.9
I think that "it was the united family of brotherhood republics of the Soviet Union that turned into the mighty power which crashed Nazism"	57.3	69.5	52.9	67.1	59.3
I think that "the victory over fascism was achieved due to the combined efforts of the USSR and the Western countries"	32.0	23.0	36.3	18.6	25.3
DA/NA	3.1	2.7	5.9	4.4	5.5

Table 10.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
I think that "the victory became possible at the expense of human and industrial resources of the Russian Federation"	3.7	2.6	3.2	2.9	8.0	5.7	24.1
I think that "it was the united family of brotherhood republics of the Soviet Union that turned into the mighty power which crashed Nazism"	62.0	72.7	68.8	53.3	65.0	73.7	50.0
I think that "the victory over fascism was achieved due to the combined efforts of the USSR and the Western countries"	33.2	23.8	23.9	35.3	25.5	16.6	17.5
DA/NA	1.1	0.9	4.1	6.5	1.5	4.0	8.4

Table 10.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
I think that "the victory became possible at the expense of human and industrial resources of the Russian Federation"	3.7	8.5	5.4	9.3	8.8
I think that "it was the united family of brotherhood republics of the Soviet Union that turned into the mighty power which crashed Nazism"	62.0	63.8	69.6	62.3	62.3
I think that "the victory over fascism was achieved due to the combined efforts of the USSR and the Western countries"	33.2	22.2	22.9	23.0	25.1
DA/NA	1.1	5.5	2.1	5.4	3.8

11. "The V All-Belarusian People's Assembly will be held on June 22-23. Which of the following opinions on All-Belarusian People's Assemblies do you share?"

Table 11.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
This is the supreme implementation of popular rule	28.0	26.0	15.7	19.7	18.9	23.4	21.9	52.6
This is the power's "show" for the people	49.2	48.0	56.9	53.7	62.9	55.3	56.6	32.1
DA/NA	22.8	26.0	27.4	26.6	18.2	21.3	21.5	24.3

Table 11.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
This is the supreme implementation of popular rule	67.4	46.5	24.7	21.6	20.9
This is the power's "show" for the people	12.6	29.7	48.9	20.7	19.6
DA/NA	20.0	23.8	26.4	20.7	19.5

Table 11.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
This is the supreme implementation of popular rule	18.8	22.2	13.7	51.4	17.6
This is the power's "show" for the people	63.9	53.7	56.9	23.8	58.2
DA/NA	17.3	24.1	29.4	24.8	24.2

Table 11.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
This is the supreme implementation of popular rule	13.9	22.6	26.6	35.3	36.0	26.7	41.2
This is the power's "show" for the people	60.5	54.0	50.9	40.6	33.5	54.0	44.3
DA/NA	25.6	23.4	22.5	24.1	30.5	19.3	14.5

Table 11.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
This is the supreme implementation of popular rule	13.9	25.7	28.1	34.2	36.2
This is the power's "show" for the people	60.5	49.3	52.3	46.7	40.1
DA/NA	25.6	25.0	19.6	19.1	23.7

12. "Part of oppositional leaders held another Congress of Democratic Forces in May. Which of the following opinions on Congresses of Democratic Forces do you share?"

Table 12.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
This is the supreme expression of people's disagreement with the policy of the power	28.2	34.0	28.9	29.9	36.4	33.0	23.1	20.2
This is the opposition's "show" for the people	44.9	38.0	43.5	39.5	42.8	42.6	48.9	49.6
DA/NA	26.9	28.0	27.6	30.6	20.8	24.4	28.0	30.2

Table 12.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
This is the supreme expression of people's disagreement with the policy of the power	15.6	14.9	27.2	30.9	37.4
This is the opposition's "show" for the people	55.2	51.9	45.1	42.3	41.5
DA/NA	29.2	33.2	27.7	26.8	21.1

Table 12.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
This is the supreme expression of people's disagreement with the policy of the power	35.6	29.2	30.7	18.4	28.9
This is the opposition's "show" for the people	40.7	45.4	39.6	51.3	41.1
DA/NA	23.7	25.4	29.7	30.3	30.0

Table 12.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
This is the supreme expression of people's disagreement with the policy of the power	30.0	29.1	27.6	31.0	20.0	22.9	35.1
This is the opposition's "show" for the people	35.2	42.3	47.5	35.1	53.0	54.9	50.4
DA/NA	34.8	28.6	24.9	33.9	27.0	22.2	14.5

Table 12.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
This is the supreme expression of people's disagreement with the policy of the power	30.0	27.4	24.6	30.4	28.7
This is the opposition's "show" for the people	35.2	49.7	49.8	44.0	46.0
DA/NA	34.8	22.9	25.6	25.6	25.3

13. "After a diplomatic conflict between Belarus and the USA, which broke out in the spring of 2008, the relationship between the two countries remains tense (the staff of the US embassy in Minsk was reduced by the factor of 5, and Belarusians have to go to other countries to obtain the US visa). Do you think it is important or not to restore normal relations with the US?"

Table 13.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
It is important to restore normal relations with the US	32.9	40.0	45.1	36.6	42.3	33.2	27.7	21.4
It is not important	23.5	18.0	18.3	20.7	22.6	21.9	26.1	27.7
I don't care	34.6	30.0	23.5	31.7	27.2	38.2	37.5	42.3
DA/NA	9.0	12.0	13.1	11.0	7.9	6.7	8.7	8.6

Table 13.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
It is important to restore normal relations with the US	15.6	19.5	31.9	37.7	40.3
It is not important	28.1	28.6	23.7	21.3	22.0
I don't care	53.1	40.9	35.6	32.0	27.5
DA/NA	3.2	11.0	8.8	9.0	10.2

Table 13.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
It is important to restore normal relations with the US	37.4	32.9	48.0	21.2	46.7
It is not important	21.5	25.9	15.7	27.3	12.2
I don't care	30.8	35.2	23.5	41.1	32.2
DA/NA	10.3	6.0	12.8	10.4	8.9

Table 13.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
It is important to restore normal relations with the US	29.3	23.8	41.0	27.1	53.5	24.7	31.1
It is not important	14.6	32.6	20.3	29.4	8.5	33.3	30.3
I don't care	50.0	37.0	34.1	38.8	19.0	32.2	25.4
DA/NA	6.1	6.6	4.6	4.7	19.0	9.8	13.2

Table 13.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
It is important to restore normal relations with the US	29.3	34.4	34.0	28.0	37.0
It is not important	14.6	25.4	27.3	23.0	26.4
I don't care	50.0	30.6	30.1	36.6	28.0
DA/NA	6.1	9.6	8.6	12.4	8.6

14. "Recently, there was an arms buildup around Belarus: Russia creates new divisions in the West region, and NATO locates their battalions in Poland and Baltic states. Some people in Belarus support Russia's actions, others support NATO and the West. What is your position about it?"

Table 14.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
I support Russia's actions: it would protect us from the possible NATO aggression	26.1	17.6	17.1	17.0	21.2	24.0	27.2	39.4
I support actions of NATO and the West: it would protect us from the possible Russian aggression	10.6	13.7	11.8	15.6	13.3	9.5	10.6	6.3
I support neither side because Belarus could be dragged into an armed conflict	57.6	60.8	64.5	61.9	59.1	62.6	56.2	48.6
DA	5.7	7.9	6.6	5.6	6.4	3.9	6.0	5.7

Table 14.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
I support Russia's actions: it would protect us from the possible NATO aggression	55.8	34.8	25.8	22.0	18.3
I support actions of NATO and the West: it would protect us from the possible Russian aggression	11.6	4.5	12.1	10.4	11.2
I support neither side because Belarus could be dragged into an armed conflict	30.5	54.2	56.4	62.3	63.4
DA	2.1	6.5	5.7	5.3	7.1

Table 14.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
I support Russia's actions: it would protect us from the possible NATO aggression	20.5	25.1	14.7	38.0	17.0
I support actions of NATO and the West: it would protect us from the possible Russian aggression	17.1	7.3	16.7	6.1	13.3
I support neither side because Belarus could be dragged into an armed conflict	55.3	62.9	64.7	49.5	64.4
DA	7.1	4.7	3.9	6.4	4.3

Table 14.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
I support Russia's actions: it would protect us from the possible NATO aggression	16.0	31.3	35.3	24.1	13.4	44.9	23.2
I support actions of NATO and the West: it would protect us from the possible Russian aggression	8.8	10.6	10.1	11.2	4.5	3.4	23.7
I support neither side because Belarus could be dragged into an armed conflict	71.1	52.9	51.4	45.3	80.1	49.4	46.1
DA	4.1	5.2	3.2	19.4	2.0	2.3	7.0

Table 14.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
I support Russia's actions: it would protect us from the possible NATO aggression	16.0	35.8	21.6	28.8	27.9
I support actions of NATO and the West: it would protect us from the possible Russian aggression	8.8	14.0	8.5	7.0	12.9
I support neither side because Belarus could be dragged into an armed conflict	71.1	47.1	65.2	57.6	49.9
DA	4.1	3.1	4.7	6.6	9.3

15. "And if such a conflict happened, which side would you support?"

Table 15.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Russia	33.6	23.5	19.6	24.7	27.9	31.1	38.9	47.1
The West	13.4	13.7	17.0	19.9	16.2	13.8	12.8	7.1
I would try not to support either side	43.5	51.0	55.6	44.5	43.0	45.9	41.5	36.3
DA/NA	9.5	11.8	7.8	11.0	12.9	9.2	6.8	9.5

Table 15.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Russia	54.2	47.1	32.7	29.5	27.5
The West	7.3	9.0	16.0	12.1	14.6
I would try not to support either side	28.1	34.2	42.6	49.2	46.8
DA/NA	10.4	9.7	8.7	9.2	11.1

Table 15.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Russia	27.9	34.0	17.6	47.6	15.6
The West	19.6	11.8	19.6	7.4	12.2
I would try not to support either side	41.1	45.9	56.9	35.0	61.1
DA/NA	11.4	8.3	5.9	10.0	11.1

Table 15.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Russia	20.8	38.1	42.7	31.0	37.5	50.9	21.8
The West	13.7	12.4	11.5	19.9	4.5	2.9	27.1
I would try not to support either side	60.8	45.1	37.6	36.8	48.5	32.0	34.9
DA/NA	4.7	4.4	8.2	12.3	9.5	14.2	16.2

Table 15.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Russia	20.8	40.3	34.5	32.9	38.0
The West	13.7	13.3	14.9	8.9	15.0
I would try not to support either side	4.8	34.1	42.3	46.9	36.2
DA/NA	4.7	12.3	8.3	11.3	10.8

16. "According to official information hundreds of Belarusian citizens participate in the battle actions in the East of Ukraine: some on the side of the Ukrainian army, others on the side of armed protesters. Belarusian powers express negative attitude towards it. Thus, a Belarusian fighter of The Right Sector has recently been confined to 5 years of imprisonment. What is your attitude to the participation of Belarusian citizens in the battle actions in Ukraine?"

Table 16.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Positive, if they are on the side of Ukrainian army	10.8	19.6	13.1	17.7	12.9	8.8	8.7	7.4
Positive, if they are on the side of participants of armed protests	10.6	9.8	14.4	12.2	9.1	10.2	8.3	11.7
Negative	70.9	56.9	63.4	64.6	73.1	72.4	72.8	74.6
DA/NA	7.7	13.7	9.1	5.5	4.9	8.6	10.2	6.3

Table 16.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Positive, if they are on the side of Ukrainian army	9.5	8.4	11.0	12.1	10.2
Positive, if they are on the side of participants of armed protests	6.3	16.8	9.7	10.2	11.2
Negative	82.1	63.8	70.1	69.7	73.9
DA/NA	2.1	11.0	9.2	8.0	4.7

Table 16.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Positive, if they are on the side of Ukrainian army	14.9	7.5	15.7	6.6	23.1
Positive, if they are on the side of participants of armed protests	12.0	9.7	10.8	10.7	9.9
Отрицательно	65.5	75.8	62.7	74.5	61.5
DA/NA	7.9	7.0	10.8	8.2	5.5

Table 16.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Positive, if they are on the side of Ukrainian army	13.0	5.7	11.0	10.5	7.0	4.0	21.5
Positive, if they are on the side of participants of armed protests	3.8	8.8	11.0	11.1	5.0	8.0	27.6
Negative	76.5	75.8	71.1	68.4	85.0	78.3	42.5
DA/NA	6.7	9.7	6.9	9.9	3.0	9.7	8.4

Table 16.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Positive, if they are on the side of Ukrainian army	13.0	11.9	8.5	11.7	9.3
Positive, if they are on the side of participants of armed protests	3.8	17.1	10.7	4.3	15.0
Negative	76.5	64.5	75.1	71.6	68.2
DA/NA	6.7	6.5	5.7	12.4	7.5

17. "Will you vote in parliamentary elections 2016?"

Table 17.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	51.8	52.9	47.1	40.4	40.8	41.5	58.9	69.7
No	19.6	9.8	19.6	25.3	27.9	23.8	19.2	9.4
I don't know yet	25.0	31.4	30.7	32.2	28.3	30.1	18.5	16.9
NA	3.6	5.9	2.6	2.1	3.0	4.6	3.4	4.0

Table 17.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	75.0	65.6	51.9	42.8	50.0
No	9.4	10.4	19.2	24.9	20.7
I don't know yet	12.5	18.8	26.5	27.3	26.2
NA	3.2	5.2	2.4	5.0	3.1

Table 17.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes	33.4	54.4	56.4	69.1	40.7
No	32.7	16.6	7.9	11.3	26.4
I don't know yet	29.0	26.1	32.7	17.1	26.4
NA	4.9	2.9	3.0	2.5	6.5

Table 17.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes	55.6	48.7	45.6	66.5	54.2	50.0	44.1
No	18.8	24.8	10.1	12.4	8.5	17.0	41.0
I don't know yet	25.6	26.5	27.6	20.6	32.3	30.7	13.1
NA	0	0	16.7	0.5	5.0	2.3	1.8

Table 17.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	55.6	48.8	44.0	58.4	52.3
No	18.8	16.4	26.2	21.0	16.7
I don't know yet	25.6	25.9	29.4	18.3	25.3
NA	0	8.9	0.4	2.3	5.7

18. "Do you believe that these elections will be free and just?"

Table 18.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes	38.1	49.0	32.0	29.5	26.4	26.2	35.7	63.0
No	36.1	25.5	37.9	42.5	47.9	45.0	36.8	17.7
DA/NA	25.8	25.5	30.1	28.0	25.7	28.8	27.5	19.3

Table 18.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes	77.9	57.8	39.2	25.2	31.6
No	16.8	16.9	33.7	44.2	45.6
DA/NA	5.3	25.3	27.1	30.6	22.8

Table 18.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes	20.5	36.1	44.1	59.8	28.6
No	53.6	36.9	25.5	18.9	40.7
DA/NA	25.9	27.0	30.4	21.3	30.7

Table 18.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes	35.2	38.1	35.3	54.1	32.5	32.0	42.5
No	42.7	39.8	29.8	38.2	25.0	32.6	41.2
DA/NA	22.1	22.1	34.9	7.7	42.5	35.4	16.3

Table 18.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes	35.2	33.1	37.4	45.5	39.7
No	42.7	33.4	38.1	35.4	32.2
DA/NA	22.1	33.5	24.5	19.1	28.1

19. "Which candidate would you prefer to vote for?"

Table 19.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
For a supporter of A. Lukashenko	25.0	21.6	17.1	12.4	16.2	15.5	21.9	50.4
For an opponent of A. Lukashenko	26.4	31.4	25.0	30.3	37.6	29.7	29.4	11.1
For another candidate	24.5	21.6	36.8	27.6	22.9	26.5	27.9	15.4
DA/NA	24.1	25.4	21.1	29.7	23.3	28.3	20.7	23.1

Table 19.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
For a supporter of A. Lukashenko	66.3	44.5	22.0	15.7	20.0
For an opponent of A. Lukashenko	11.6	11.0	26.6	30.9	32.9
For another candidate	13.7	14.8	27.7	28.3	22.0
DA/NA	8.4	29.7	23.7	25.1	25.1

Table 19.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
For a supporter of A. Lukashenko	13.2	20.3	21.0	48.0	11.0
For an opponent of A. Lukashenko	34.0	28.6	34.0	11.2	36.3
For another candidate	23.7	30.3	25.0	18.1	22.0
DA/NA	29.1	20.8	20.0	22.7	30.7

Table 19.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
For a supporter of A. Lukashenko	14.6	19.8	23.4	48.8	20.5	29.7	27.5
For an opponent of A. Lukashenko	42.9	32.6	18.3	12.4	24.0	16.6	26.6
For another candidate	24.1	27.3	26.1	29.4	15.5	23.4	25.8
DA/NA	18.4	20.3	32.2	9.4	40.0	30.3	20.1

Table 19.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
For a supporter of A. Lukashenko	14.6	22.5	27.3	29.2	30.3
For an opponent of A. Lukashenko	42.9	17.7	21.6	28.4	22.5
For another candidate	24.1	27.3	26.2	21.8	23.1
DA/NA	18.4	32.5	24.9	20.6	24.1

20. "Do you believe that results of elections depend on your vote?"

Table 20.1. Depending on age

Variant of answer	All respondents	Age, years						
		18-19	20-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +
Yes, they do	37.5	47.1	26.8	29.9	26.4	29.4	35.1	60.9
No, they don't	45.6	31.4	57.5	52.4	59.2	52.5	45.3	24.3
DA/NA	16.9	21.5	15.7	17.7	14.4	18.1	19.6	14.8

Table 20.2. Depending on education

Variant of answer	Education				
	Primary	Incomplete secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Higher (including incomplete)
Yes, they do	72.9	51.9	37.2	27.1	33.9
No, they don't	19.8	24.7	45.6	56.3	49.8
DA/NA	7.3	23.4	17.2	16.6	16.3

Table 20.3. Depending on status

Variant of answer	Status				
	Private sector employees	Public sector employees	Students	Pensioners	Unemployed, housewives
Yes, they do	21.5	37.5	39.2	57.0	24.4
No, they don't	57.3	48.8	39.2	28.6	55.6
DA/NA	21.2	13.7	21.6	14.4	20.0

Table 20.4. Depending on place of residence

Variant of answer	Region						
	Minsk	Minsk region	Brest and its region	Grodno and its region	Vitebsk and its region	Mogilev and its region	Gomel and its region
Yes, they do	31.3	36.1	39.4	51.8	25.5	48.6	36.2
No, they don't	50.0	49.8	36.2	43.5	45.5	35.4	54.1
DA/NA	18.7	14.1	24.4	4.7	29.0	16.0	9.7

Table 20.5. Depending on settlement type

Variant of answer	Settlement type				
	Capital	Region centers	Cities	Towns	Villages
Yes, they do	31.3	36.5	33.0	45.9	40.7
No, they don't	50.0	41.3	50.4	42.4	44.3
DA/NA	18.7	22.2	16.6	11.7	15.0

OPEN FORUM

In this issue of the ISEPS analytical bulletin under the heading "Open Forum" we continue to publish a selection of data from sociological surveys conducted by our colleagues in foreign countries with our brief comments.

Despite purposeful efforts of the Belarusian leadership to design their own model of development, its uniqueness is relative. This conclusion applies to economic, political, social and other components of the Belarusian model. We believe that the comparative analysis of social processes in other countries will allow readers to better understand the results of researches on the Belarusian society.

PUTIN'S INDESTRUCTIBLE POPULARITY

In June 2016, answering the question "Do you think the state of things is developing in our country in the right or in the wrong direction in general?", 29.1% of Belarusians chose the variant "in the right direction", while 57% – "in the wrong direction". The policy correctness index (PCI), calculated as a difference between positive and negative answers, amounted to – 27.9 points.

In Russia, according to "Levada-Center", 55% of respondents believe that the state of things is developing in the right direction, 33% of respondents share the opposite opinion (Table 1). Accordingly, PCI amounts to +22. It means that Russians' opinion on the development of their country is mirror-like in comparison with Belarusians! But at the peak of patriotic euphoria in August 2014 PCI was almost twice as high – 44 points, while before the annexation of Crimea it was oscillating near zero mark.

spondents aged between 18 and 30 and 70% of respondents aged over 60 (65% on average); by 66% of respondents with secondary and below secondary education and by 66% of respondents with higher education; by 59% of Muscovites and by 68% of rural population.

Results of June surveys are another proof of V. Putin's indestructible popularity after the Crimean campaign. Neither the collapse of the ruble, nor the most notorious corruption scandals (in particular, the verdict to Ye. Vasilyeva in the case of "Oboronservis", which disappointed more than one) seemingly didn't shake people's conviction that Kremlin boss wishes them good. President cares about people's well-being, but the resistance of bureaucracy and the weakness of President's team prevent the improvements – this is the summary of answers to the question on V. Putin's motives, obtained from 42% and 49% of respondents by "Levada-Center" in October 2014 and 2015 accordingly.

As for the activities of D. Medvedev and the govern-

Table 1

Dynamics of answering the question: "Is Russia moving in the right direction or this course is a dead-end?", %

Variant of answer	06'10	06'11	06'12	06'13	06'14	06'15	06'16
In the right direction	47	44	44	41	62	64	55
On the wrong track	35	39	38	43	22	22	33
PCI	12	5	6	–2	40	42	22

The double-fold decrease of PCI comparatively to its peak value isn't really reflected in the approval of the activities of V. Putin as the President of Russia. In June 2016 81% of respondents approved them, and 18% – disapproved. In August 2015 these shares amounted to 84% and 15% accordingly. Let us remind you that the record high level of approval was registered in June 2015 – 89%.

V. Putin's trust rating (open question) amounted to 51% in June 2016 (Prime Minister D. Medvedev's rating amounted to 13%). In comparison with its peak value in June-July 2015 it lost 13 points.

According to Public Opinion Foundation, President V. Putin's rating amounted to 65% on June 26, 2016. This is a minimal value over the last two years. It lost 11 points in comparison with its peak.

As opposed to Belarusians, Russians' attitude to their President doesn't really depend on socio-demographic characteristics. Thus, on June 26, 2016, positive attitude to V. Putin was declared by 62% of re-

spondents, public opinion is steadily dissatisfied with it. D. Medvedev's ratings become worse and worse every year, regardless of his position as the President or the Prime Minister. The share of Russians convinced that D. Medvedev represents interests of oligarchs, bankers and big business increased three-fold (from 12% up to 35%) over the period from the end of 2007 to the middle of 2013 (according to "Levada-Center"). Over the same period of time, the share of respondents believing that D. Medvedev represents common people, workers, employees, rural workers dropped 3.5-fold.

SAVING AS SURVIVAL STRATEGY

Economic crisis becomes the main topic of social life in Russia on the eve of the new elections which will take place on September 18. Domination of crisis topic is quite understandable. Almost two thirds of population, according to "Levada-Center", spend half of their

incomes on food. Each fifth respondent estimates their financial position as bad or very bad.

Over 80% of Russians are convinced that the crisis in the country will continue. People, as a rule, don't expect that the crisis will end soon. Almost 40% of respondents think that it will last for at least another year or two (Table 2).

Table 2

Dynamics of answering the question: "For how long, according to you, this crisis will last?", % (shares of those who believe that there is a crisis in Russia now)

Variant of answer	12'14	03'15	09'15	12'15	03'16	04'16
2-3 months	4	3	1	1	>1	2
Half a year	8	5	4	4	4	6
Between a year and a year and a half	19	19	23	18	19	19
Not less than two years	21	22	24	23	25	20
The crisis will be prolonged, its consequences will be manifested for many years	16	17	23	21	24	21
It is difficult to say now how long it will last	21	24	16	22	20	22
DA	12	10	10	12	8	11

The latest surveys demonstrate that nearly 44% of Russians consider that crisis is the main internal threat for Russia. According to a report of "Levada-Center", this index is record high over the last 10 years and it never exceeded 37% before.

According to conclusions of experts from the Higher School of Economics (HSE), the share of extremely poor population which doesn't have enough money even for buying food amounts to 9% today. In April 2016 Almost half of respondents noticed a worsening of their financial position over the last 12 months, says the May HSE report on social well-being of Russians. Among these respondents, 93% of families stated that they felt these changes in relation to the current economic situation in the country.

Saving on goods and services becomes the most widespread strategy of adaptation to macroeconomic shocks. The main subject of saving is entertainment – 48% of families name it. 47% of Russians mentioned that they cut down their expenses on buying clothes and shoes. 45% of Russians are obliged to save on food. Among rarer subjects of saving are medical services and medicines (32%) and educational services (15%). Though, the main explanation for this is the fact that these expenses are not wide-spread among population in general.

Employers put additional pressure on Russians by cutting down salaries and paying them late. "On average, 40% of Russians families ran into negative situations on the labor market over the last three months", say the experts.

Let us remind you that only recently Russia was the leader of salaries level among the CIS countries. Today the situation is completely different. Converted to US dollars, average salary in Russia amounts to only \$ 558, and this is a third off the level of 2014. According to the current level of salaries, Russia is close to Kazakhstan, where it amounted to \$ 549 at year-end 2015 (\$ 415 in Belarus).

According to POF, in the end of May 47% of Russians evaluated the situation in Russia as bad, 44% – as satisfactory, 4% – as good. The number of people thinking that it becomes worse is still bigger than the number of those who share the opposite opinion: 44% and 12% accordingly. According to WCIOM, almost half of respondents (48%) believe that the hardest

times are still ahead. 19% share the opposite opinion.

However, over the last three months the growth of negative social moods has stopped. In Spring social well-being traditionally becomes better, but there is another reason too. "There is a routinization of crisis", says M. Mamonov, research project manager at WCIOM.

Population is busy trying to survive. The share of those who see current survival as their main priority amounted to 41% and turned out to be bigger than the same indicator in the beginning of 2000s. Orientation on survival hampers the demand for social and economic changes, and it delays the way out of crisis. Unfavorable emotional background may persist for many years. Amid such mindsets it is very difficult to build the trajectory of development, since social apathy is a much more dramatic variant for a country in comparison to social irritation.

GEOPOLITICAL PREFERENCES OF UKRAINIANS REMAIN STABLE

After winning Crimea, Russia headily loses Ukraine. Over two years both countries moved away from one another on a historically longest distance.

According to the latest results of the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), 44% of Ukrainians advocate closing the borders with Russia, introducing the visa regime and customs. In February 2014, i.e. prior to the overthrow of V. Yanukovich, the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in Donbass, only 15% of population shared this opinion, while 68% of respondents were against visas, customs and borders.

"Levada-Center" registers similar dynamics in Russia. In March 2014 only 16% of Russians wished that Russia had the same relations with Ukraine as with majority of other foreign countries. Now this share amounts to 36%. It had never been that high since the first regular survey in 2008. Also, 43% of respondents

don't consider Russians and Ukrainians as a united nation (17% in November 2005).

Russian powers constantly declare that economies and markets of Russia and Ukraine are interconnected. Even before the events of 2014 Kiev's orientation on European integration caused skepticism in Moscow, and the preference of an agreement with the EU over joining the Customs Union was considered to be an error by many people in the Russian capital. There is a share of truth in this opinion. Economic connection is still there, and many Ukrainians go to Russia to earn more money. However, the results of the KIIS survey demonstrate that more and more Ukrainians are ready to encounter difficulties caused by closing of the borders and introducing visas. It's hard to believe that 44% don't foresee the costs of it.

facing the country, a steady majority continues to support pro-European choice. In particular, in May 2016 49% of Ukrainians would have voted for joining the EU, 26% would have voted against, and 24% wouldn't have voted or didn't know what to answer (65% vs 35% relatively to the number of those who are ready to vote).

In addition to the Western vector let us note that in May 43.9% of respondents supported entering NATO, 38% were against it, and 18.1% didn't know how to answer (Table 3). But these are average values. The level of NATO support differs 6-fold between the West and the Donbass!

The idea of joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan doesn't enjoy popularity among Ukrainians. In May 2016 16.6% of respondents would have voted for it, while the share of those who

Table 3

Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you support Ukraine entering NATO?" depending the region, %

Variant of answer	Average	The West	The Center	The South	The East	The Donbass
Support	43.9	63.3	50.8	27.0	24.0	10.9
Don't support	38.0	16.3	28.8	58.1	59.6	83.7
DA	18.1	20.4	20.6	14.9	16.4	5.4

Table 4

Distribution of answers to the question: "Which of the following groups of population do you think you belong to?", %

Variant of answer	Russia	Ukraine
We don't have enough money for food	3	18
We have enough money for food, but not for clothes	18	50
We have enough money for food and clothes, but buying more expensive things, such as a TV set or a fridge, is difficult	54	29
We can buy some expensive things, such as a TV set or a fridge, but we can't buy a car	21	2
We can buy a car, but we can't say that we are not cash-strapped	3	<1
We can deny ourselves nothing	<1	<1
DA	1	1

Moreover, more and more Russians are ready to support the final divorce too. They are not going to wait until Ukrainians "come to their senses", understand and return back to the habitual post-Soviet harbor. Two years of propaganda, on TV in the first place, left their trace. This propaganda demonstrated Ukrainian powers as obedient marionettes of the West which hates Russia, and Ukrainians as fascists and chasteners. It is understandable that many Russians want to fence themselves away from such a country, to introduce visas and punish this country economically.

Russian power can count on a growing support of public opinion when they go to the length of unparalleled freeze of relationships with Ukraine. Same public opinion supports annexation of Crimea by Russia, and the share of answers "definitely yes" (57%) wasn't as high as it is now since March 2014. But was it the aim of the Russian power? Was this the national interest of Russia in Ukraine?

Geopolitical preferences of Ukrainians remain stable over the last year and a half. Despite the hardships

would have voted against was 3.4 times as high (57%), i.e. 22% vs. 78% relatively to the number of those who are ready to vote.

Men do not live by bread alone. This biblical truth is confirmed by the answers to the question of Table 4. Despite the fact that self-evaluations of financial well-being of respondents in Russia and Ukraine are fundamentally different (6-fold in the first row!), Ukrainians do not see Russia as a source of "mild power" and do not desire to integrate with the country which "gets up off its knees" so successfully.

Such a significant difference in the evaluations of financial well-being couldn't but influence the evaluations of the course of countries' development. In May only 11% of Ukrainians agreed that the leadership of Ukraine leads the country in the right direction (76% – in the wrong direction). In Russia the share of positive answers is higher: 49% vs. 33%.

It is natural, that the evaluations of Presidents' activities are fundamentally different too. In Ukraine the work of P. Poroshenko was assessed positively by

Table 5

Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you think that Ukraine needs a strong leader with wide powers?" depending on region, %

Variant of answer	Average	The West	The Center	The South	The East	The Donbass
Yes	82	85.3	82.3	86.1	77.5	72.7
No	9.1	6.6	10.6	6.1	11.1	10.9
DA	8.9	8.2	7.2	7.8	11.4	16.4

Table 6

Distribution of answers to the question: "Who would you prefer to see as the next President of the US?", %

Country	Rating*	Country	Rating
Mexico	54	India	29
Italy	38	Australia	29
South Korea	37	Turkey	28
Germany	36	Japan	27
Spain	35	The SAR	24
The UK	34	Saudi Arabia	20
Brazil	34	Canada	17
Indonesia	33	China	12
France	30	Russia	-21
Argentina	30		

* Prefer H. Clinton – prefer D. Trump

Table 7

Distribution of answers to the question: "Are you financially satisfied?", %

Country	No	Yes	Country	No	Yes
India	33	63	Argentina	67	28
The UK	34	58	China	67	29
Germany	40	54	France	64	25
The US	44	48	Japan	62	18
Australia	44	47	Turkey	72	25
Canada	49	44	Mexico	73	24
Saudi Arabia	47	38	Brazil	76	23
Indonesia	53	43	The SAR	76	22
Spain	63	33	Russia	79	19
Italy	65	28	South Korea	80	15

14.1% of respondents and negatively by 70.1% of respondents. In Russia approval of V. Putin's work remains abnormally high – 80%.

In person-centric political cultures such a low level of approval is a sure sign of formation of power vacuum. The answers to the question "Do you think that Ukraine needs a strong leader with wide powers?" confirms this (82% – yes, 9% – no).

As Table 5 demonstrates it, there is a consensus regarding this question. This is a rare phenomenon in the modern Ukraine.

There is no evident contender for the role of Ukrainian "bat'ka" yet. In the list of 25 politicians, compiled by the sociologists from the KIIS, N. Sachenko has the highest trust rating – 35% (32.7% don't trust). A. Sadovyi is on the second place – 32.3% vs. 40.7%. Yu. Tymoshenko came third with 28% vs. 57.3%. President P. Poroshenko takes the seventh place with 16.1% vs. 69.3%.

The most trusted institutions are the Church and the Army – 63.7% and 63.2% accordingly. In this regard Ukrainians are not very different from Belarusians and Russians. But the next three positions in the trust rating are occupied by volunteer organizations which help resettlers (55.7%) and army (55.3%) and volunteer battalions (49.2%).

PARADOXES OF G20

Russia is the only country of the G20 major economies where people would rather D. Trump was the next President of the US than H. Clinton. In all the other countries H. Clinton has a significant lead. This sensational result was revealed by a YouGov research of over 20000 adults in every G20 country for Handelsblatt Global Edition (Table 6).

In Russia 31% of respondents support D. Trump and 10% – H. Clinton. According to the survey, H. Clinton's lead over D. Trump is highest in Mexico.

Not very surprising taking into account that a President D. Trump would screen this country behind a concrete wall along the US southern border, and deport millions migrants from the US.

Italians, Germans, Spaniards, and South Koreans also actively support H. Clinton. Her smallest lead over D. Trump comes from China and Canada.

Such a marked uniqueness of Russians' preferences needs an explanation. Director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies in the Russian Academy of Sciences S. Rogov says that Russians' traditionally believe "that it is easier to deal with Republicans, since they have conservative positions and can get closer with Moscow without fearing accusations of treachery".

This explanation, however, doesn't look very convincing due to the fact that public opinion in Russia is unable to register differences between the policies of Republicans and Democrats. The reason, probably, is in the personality of D. Trump.

Russian mass media constantly represent him as a man who defied the official US, the very US that is regarded negatively by 80% of Russians (according to "Levada-Center" surveys conducted in 2014-2015).

YouGov research also provides information for comparing the satisfaction of populations of G20 countries with their financial well-being (Table 7). The first thing that hits the eye is the lack of correlation between this indicator and the development of economy. Thus, the first two places in the rating are taken by India (\$ 6 thousand of purchasing power parity per capita according to IMF data for 2015) and the UK (\$ 41 thousand). The last two places are taken by Russia (\$ 25 thousand) and South Korea (\$ 37 thousand).

*levada.ru; fom.ru; isp.hse.ru; wciom.ru;
kiis.com.ua; yougov.co.uk*

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